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THE ARENA: DEFENDANT'S CHOICE OF FORUM
CLINTON H. CODDINGTON* AND RANDOLPH S. HICKS* *
I. INTRODUCTION
T HROUGHOUT THE pendency of a case, the choice of a forum
in complex aviation litigation is one of the most important
strategic decisions to be made by trial counsel, his client, and/or
his principal. This choice is as important as the strategic choice
made by a battlefield commander regarding the arena in which
his troops will be committed; yet, it is extraordinary how often
little time is spent by lawyers in these choices as compared with
their counterparts in war. Strategy, we are told, is the "employ-
ment of the battle to gain the end of the war."' It is the "link
which binds the series of acts that lead to the final decision."'
What more crucial strategic consideration could there be than the
choice of the place at which to wage the friendly strife?
This article will deal with choice of judges, jurors, courts, corn-
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at Berkeley and received his J.D. in 1968. He has served since 1977 as an
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munities, evidence (and access to it), and witnesses (and access
to them). In addition, it will treat choice of rules and principles of
law by which actions are tried and relief granted or denied. We
address these choices from the viewpoint of a defendant who, with-
out the benefit of having the initial choice, must decide what
alternatives, if any, exist and which choice might best aid his
cause. We, like defenders in war, have important choices of
locality' and geography' and opportunities to assemble our power
in space' and time.'
II. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN
SELECTING THE FORUM
A. In General
Establishment of criteria for forum selection by a defendant who
is disenchanted with the plaintiff's choice is challenging indeed.'
Weighing the various considerations which contribute to the de-
cision to seek an alternative forum requires extensive legal re-
search on substantive and procedural law, a thorough knowledge,
understanding and analysis of the facts of the case at bar, and an
understanding of all of the opportunities and dangers existing in
the alternative forum being considered.
Plaintiff's counsel normally has many selections from which to
choose; the defendant but one or two alternative forums to which
he may have a chance of moving the case. In the best of all worlds,
the defendant would choose a forum where both it and its counsel
are well known and loved, where the law is highly favorable, where
courts are strict constructionists and friendly to defendants, where
discovery rules and laws are liberal, and where the "reach" of the
local court is insufficient to bring defendant's employees before
the trier of fact. Lamentably, such a choice never exists and defense
counsel is thus left with the more difficult task of weighing the
factors.
3 Id. at 193.
4 1d. at 250.
51 Id. at 276.
Old. at 277.
'For a discussion of forum selection from a plaintiff's standpoint see Abram-
son, Where to Sue in Aviation Products Liability Cases, 40 J. AIR L. & COM. 369
(1974).
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Among the important factors for defense counsel to weigh is
whether to try the case in a local forum. Litigation in local courts
where counsel is familiar with local procedures, judges, and at-
tach6s, is obviously desirable, all other things being equal. This
choice is often made by the plaintiff's counsel, to the defendant's
distress, during both discovery and trial.
The values and interests of the various communities being con-
sidered are extremely important. Whether jurors are likely to come
from urban, suburban or rural areas is significant. The different
make-up between federal and state court juries must be accounted
for. A review of past jury verdicts in the communities being con-
sidered is appropriate, and contact with local counsel is indispensa-
ble in making these comparisons.
When possible, counsel should compare the available judiciary.
In California and other states there are books available which give
biographical data on courts. Once again, local counsel can be of
invaluable assistance in evaluating the judiciary, particularly when
counsel is considering trial by the court as opposed to trial by jury.
Local rules of court, including pre-trial procedures, evidence,
and discovery, must be separately analyzed and compared with the
forum selected by the plaintiff in determining whether to move.'
The degree to which alternative sites permit practice by out-of-state
counsel may be a factor. Counsel must also consider -that some
courts order, as a means of exerting pressure, sessions six days a
week, three evening sessions a week, multiple juries and the like.
Differences in substantive rules of law dealing with such areas
as products liability, common carriers, financial responsibility acts,
damages, statutes of limitations, and claim statutes are critically
important. It is theoretically true that transfer under either section
1404(a)' or section 1407"° of the Judicial Code does not result in
a change of substantive law because the transferee court is bound
to apply the transferor court's choice of law rules.1' As a practical
8 For a discussion of pretrial procedures in the federal courts see Kahn, Local
Pretrial Rules in Federal Courts, 6 ABA LITIGATION SECTION 34 (1980).
'28 U.S.C. S 1404(a) (1976).
1028 U.S.C. S 1407 (1976).
" Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964); In Re Aircrash Disaster at
John F. Kennedy Int'l. Airport on June 24, 1975, 407 F. Supp. 244 (J.P.M.D.L.
1976).
1981]
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matter, however, a change usually does result since the transferee
court invariably finds a way, to the extent possible, to apply its
own rules and laws since it is more familiar with them. Procedural
and choice of law considerations are extremely important in eval-
uating these potential choices. Thorough understanding of these
rules of law gained through consultation with local counsel, per-
haps defendant's in-house counsel and its insurers (who after all
should have a more global view of the situation) is necessary.
Whether defendant's corporate domicile is an advantageous fo-
rum can be a more troublesome question than it might appear su-
perficially. It is not necessarily true that large local employers are
popular with their citizenry. Additionally, it may not be desirable
to be "at home" where the reach of process of local courts can
compel the attendance of employees whose appearance, demeanor
and testimony may be inimical to the defense at trial.
Convenience or inconvenience to counsel is a critical factor in
the selection of a forum. From the defendant's viewpoint, this may
be of little moment if success on a transfer or dismissal motion re-
sults in acquisition of new local counsel. Invariably transfer is inim-
ical to plaintiff's counsel since presumably he has already selected
the most convenient forum. Depending on the various attorneys'
relationship with the courts, distances involved, time in the case,
familiarity with the product or procedures involved, a judgment
must be made of relative convenience and expense.
Court congestion is a very important consideration in transfer
evaluation. If, for example, the alternative forum being considered
produces long delay, and if it is felt that the plaintiffs lack the fi-
nancial ability to survive the delay, that factor may tip the balance.
On the other hand, counsel must consider the effect of presentation
of stale evidence.
B. Federal Versus State Courts
Although many defense practitioners in California and parts of
New York might well disagree, federal courts are often thought to
be more competent than their state court counterparts. The rules of
discovery and evidence are generally more liberal in federal court
than in state courts, although there are exceptions. Pre-trial pro-
ceedings in federal courts are much more flexible than those in
DEFENDANT'S CHOICE OF FORUM
state courts. Judges in federal court, however, exercise a great
deal more power and control than those in state courts. This re-
sults in less flexibility and is much more burdensome to all coun-
sel. Both sides of the bar normally disfavor pre-trial discovery in
federal courts. In addition to the power wielded by the federal
judge, counsel should consider that the subpoena power of the
federal court is more extensive than that of the state court.
Unanimous verdicts are required in civil actions in federal courts
and this is generally thought to favor the defendant rather than the
plaintiff. In reality, however, since the difficulty is normally caused
by one or two hold-outs, the argument probably cuts both ways, es-
pecially with weak burdens of proof now existing in many jurisdic-
tions. Federal jury panels are felt to be more defense oriented since,
as a rule, they are more heterogeneous, come from a wider geogra-
phical area, have a higher percentage of male jurors and come from
a higher socio-economic status.
Counsel must consider that the judge has the power to and us-
ually does conduct extensive and exclusive voir dire, whereas in
most state courts it is conducted by counsel. Furthermore, judges
in federal courts are more apt than their state court counterparts to
interfere with the proceedings, cross-question witnesses, comment
upon the evidence, and the like. In addition counsel must consider
that, in federal court, transfer vehicles such as sections 1404(a)
and 1407 are available; this is invariably not the case in state
courts.
The final comment which should be made with respect to a
choice between federal and state courts concerns the inherent and
express power of federal judges to resolve matters without a jury
trial. Federal courts are much more likely to grant any one of a
number of available summary resolutions and are much more like-
ly to take action which would produce an abrupt and early reso-
lution of the case. Such propensities should be evaluated in light
of the case at bar and its strengths and weaknesses.
HI. VEHICLES AVAILABLE To
EFFECT THE CHANGE
Although a defendant's ability to change a forum may be some-
what limited when the litigation is commenced in the state courts,
1981]
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a number of vehicles exist under federal law for producing a
change of courtrooms. We shall examine the primary tools which
exist in the federal courts: dismissal under the common law doc-
trine of forum non conveniens, transfer under section 1404(a),
and transfer under section 1407. We shall also briefly look at sim-
ilar procedures available in state court practice. For our purposes
it will be assumed that subject matter jurisdiction, personal juris-
diction and venue are proper under the applicable federal and
state law in the forum initially selected by plaintiff.
A. Forum Non Conveniens-Dismissal
1. Introduction
The doctrine of forum non conveniens has recently experienced
a dramatic evolution and has been liberally applied by both fed-
eral and state courts in several cases."2 The courts increasingly have
invoked the doctrine when the litigation arises out of an accident
that occurred outside of the United States and is brought by plain-
tiffs who are neither citizens nor residents of the United States. In
such circumstances the courts reason that since the litigation has
little or no connection with the selected forum, other than the fact
that defendants do business there or the forum is the home of plain-
tiffs' counsel, it should be dismissed.'" The expansion of the laws of
12Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 50 U.S.L.W. 4055 (1981); Alcoa Steam-
ship Co., Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 636 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1980); Pain v.
United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Dahi v. United
Technologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas. 18,352 (3d Cir. 1980); Schertenleib v. Traum,
589 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1978); Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d
880 (2d Cir. 1978); Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1975);
Grodinsky v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1245 (D. Md. 1981); Fosen
v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), af0'd, No.
80-7180 (2d Cir. June 13, 1980); Macedo v. The Boeing Co., 15 Av. Cas. 18,032
(N.D. Ill. 1980); Orion Ins. Co. Ltd. v. United Technologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas.
18,061 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Bouvy-Loggers v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
15 Av. Cas. 17,153 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Hemmelgarn v. The Boeing Co., 106 Cal.
App. 3d 576, 165 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1980); Jagger v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, 96 Cal. App. 3d 579, 158 Cal. Rptr. 163 (1979); Hudson's Bay & An-
nings Ltd. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 15 Av. Cas. 18,496 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1980).
But see Grimandi v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 512 F. Supp. 764 (D. Kan. 1981);
Petroleum Helicopters de Columbia, S.A. v. Textron, Inc., 15 Av. Cas. 18,112
(D.D.C. 1980).
1See Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Orion Ins. Co. Ltd. v. United Technologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas. 18,061 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Hudson's Bay & Annings Ltd. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 15 Av. Cas.
18,496 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1980).
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jurisdiction and venue, coupled with the plaintiffs' ability to select
virtually any forum, has subjected the plaintiffs' initial forum se-
lection to closer scrutiny and less deference by the courts.'
2. History
The doctrine of forum non conveniens, which had its origin in
the common law of Scotland," was introduced into federal diversity
jurisdiction by Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert," decided by the Supreme
Court in 1947. Although the Court has never determined defini-
tively whether federal or state law of forum non conveniens applies
in a diversity case,' most federal courts have applied federal law.'"
For over three decades Gulf Oil Corp. has been recognized as the
leading authority on the doctrine.
Stated simply, the principle of forum non conveniens is that "a
court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when juris-
diction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute." The
court is permitted to decline jurisdiction even though jurisdiction
and venue are proper, on the theory that the convenience of the
parties and witnesses or the ends of justice require that the action
be tried in another judicial forum. The doctrine applies to any
civil action and to admiralty actions brought by either American
resident libelants or foreign libelants."
3. Limitations on the Doctrine
a. The Existence of a More Convenient Federal Forum
With the enactment of Section 1404(a) in 1948, which author-
izes the transfer of a case from one federal district to another on
forum non conveniens grounds, dismissal on the basis of forum
41In Dahi v. United Technologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas. 18,352 (3d Cir. 1980),
the court stated: "Courts know from experience that the selection of a forum is
sometimes dictated not only by the search for justice but the temptation of the
plaintiff 'to resort to a strategy forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for
an adversary, even at some inconvenience to himself'. " Id. at 18,353.
"s Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARv. L. Rnv. 908, 909-11
(1947).
1 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
17See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 50 U.S.L.W. 4055, 4059 n.13 (1981).
" See, e.g., Ciprari v. Services Aereos Cruzerio do Sul, 232 F. Supp. 433, 442
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
19 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
"Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 636 F.2d 860 (2d Cir.
1980); Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc. 521 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1975).
19811
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non conveniens is not proper when there is a significantly more
convenient federal forum to which the action can be transferred."
The traditional remedy of dismissal, however, is available where
the more convenient forum is a foreign country."
b. The Citizenship or Residence of the Parties
The citizenship or residence of the parties generally has not re-
cently been accorded talismanic significance by the courts.' The
courts have repeatedly noted that under the common law and
under admiralty law "American citizenship is not an impenetrable
shield against dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens. ' '
In Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent,' the court
expressly rejected the notion that Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual
21 Paper Operations Consultants Int'l, Ltd. v. S. S. Hong Kong Amber, 513
F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1975); Macedo v. The Boeing Co., 15 Av. Cas. 18,032,
18,033 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
'DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 899 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 904 (1978); Macedo v. The Boeing Co., 15 Av. Cas. 18,032, 18,033
(N.D. Ill. 1980); Harrison v. United Fruit Co., 141 F. Supp. 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
23See Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc., v. M/V Nordic Regent, 636 F.2d 860, 867
(2d Cir. 1980); Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
2 Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 636 F.2d 860, 870-71
(2d Cir. 1980). See Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.
1978); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 645 (2d Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956); Dasi v. Air India, 16 Av. Cas. 17,308, 17,310
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). In Vanity Fair Mills, the court stated "[a]n American citizen
does not have an absolute right under all circumstances to sue in an Ameri-
can Court." 234 F.2d at 645. See also Silver v. Great American Ins. Co., 29
N.Y.2d 356, 278 N.E.2d 619, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972), where the court rejected
a long-standing rule that the residence of either party to an action barred a
New York court from dismissing the action on the ground of forum non con-
veniens. The Silver court stated:
Although such residence is, of course, an important factor to be
considered, forum non conveniens relief should be granted when it
plainly appears that New York is an inconvenient forum and that
another is available which will best serve the ends of justice and the
convenience of the parties. The great advantage of the doctrine-its
flexibility based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case
-is severely, if not completely, undercut when our courts are pre-
vented from applying it solely because one of the parties is a New
York resident or corporation.
29 N.Y.2d at 361, 278 N.E.2d at 622, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 402-03. Rule 327 of
New York's Civil Practice Law & Rules codifies the Silver doctrine and provides
that "[t]he domicile or residence in this state of any party to the action shall not
preclude the court from staying or dismissing the action." N.Y. Civ. Pac. § 327
(McKinney Supp. 1980).
636 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Casualty Co.," a Supreme Court opinion decided the same day as
Gulf Oil Corp., established a different standard where plaintiff
sued in his home forum." The court impliedly rejected language in
Olympic Corp. v. Societe Generale"8 which stated that defendant's
burden is greater when an American plaintiff is to be consigned to
a foreign forum, and held that the American citizenship of a plain-
tiff did not justify creating a special rule of forum non conven-
iens.' Thus, a defendant's burden is not increased when plaintiff
is an American citizen, it may, however, be lessened when the
plaintiff is of foreign citizenship.'
c. The Existence of an Alternative Foreign Forum
The principle of forum non conveniens "presupposes at least
two forums in which defendant is amenable to process." 1 In con-
trast to the limitations imposed under the federal forum non con-
veniens venue transfer statute,2 however, the court has the power to
330 U.S. 518 (1947).
27 Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 636 F.2d 860, 869 (2d
Cir. 1980). In Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947), a de-
rivative action commenced in the Eastern District of New York by a New York
plaintiff against Illinois defendants, the Supreme Court had stated:
Where there are only two parties to a dispute, there is good reason
why it should be tried in the plaintiff's home forum if that has been
his choice. He should not be deprived of the presumed advantages
of his home jurisdiction except upon a clear showing of facts which
either (1) establish such oppressiveness and vexation to a defen-
dant as to be out of all proportion to plaintiffs convenience, which
may be shown to be slight or non-existent, or (2) make trial in the
chosen forum inappropriate because of considerations effecting the
court's own administrative and legal problems. In any balancing of
conveniences, a real showing of convenience by the plaintiff who
has sued in his home forum will normally outweigh the inconven-
ience that defendant may have shown.
330 U.S. at 524.
28 462 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1972).
29 Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 636 F.2d 860 (2d Cir.
1980). But see Macedo v. The Boeing Co., 15 Av. Cas. 18,032, 18,034 (N.D. Ill.
1980); Olympic Corp. v. Societe Generale, 462 F.2d 375, 378 (2d Cir. 1975);
Founding Church of Scientology v. Verlag, 536 F.2d 429, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 50 U.S.L.W. 4055, 4061 (1981).
3" Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1948). See Dahl v. United
Technologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas. 18,352, 18,353 (3d Cir. 1980).
32 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), the court
held that transfer was authorized only to an alternative forum in which jurisdic-
tion over the defendant might have been obtained at the time suit was commenced,
irrespective of defendant's consent.
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apply the remedy of dismissal under the doctrine "even if there
[is] no alternative forum in which plaintiff could have originally
commenced his action without the consent of defendant."' A
defendant's consent to submit voluntarily to the jurisdiction of
the more convenient foreign forum is usually sufficient to invoke
the doctrine, and the court will not determine whether a defendant
was initially subject to compulsory jurisdiction in the foreign fo-
rum. '
A few recent cases have introduced an additional limitation and
require that the alternative federal forum not only be able to exer-
cise jurisdiction over defendant but also that it be "proper"' or
"suitable."' As a condition to dismissal, the element has been gen-
erally satisfied by the courts' requirement that: (1) defendant con-
sent to personal jurisdiction or agree to accept service of process in
the foreign forum; ' (2) defendant waive any defense of the sta-
tute of limitations or consider the statute having been tolled since
institution of the action ;'8 and (3) defendant offer a letter of guar-
anty that a foreign judgment will be satisfied or agree to pay any
judgment rendered against it by a foreign court." In concluding
that Norway was a "proper" alternative forum, one court examined
Norway's substantive and evidentiary laws and judicial procedures,
' Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1978). But see Tivoli Realty
v. Interstate Circuit, 167 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 837
(1948).
s Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1978).
Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 503 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aff'd, No. 80-7180 (2d Cir. June 13, 1980).
" Dahli v. United Technologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas. 18,352, 18,353 (3d Cir.
1980).
" Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas. 18,352, 18,353 (3d Cir.
1980); Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 636 F.2d 860, 865 (2d
Cir. 1978); Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 503 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aff'd, No. 80-7180 (2d Cir. June 13, 1980); Bouvy-Loggers v. Pan Ameri-
can World Airways, Inc., 15 Av. Cas. 17,153, 17,155 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Hemmel-
garn v. The Boeing Co., 106 Cal. App. 3d 576, 581, 165 Cal. Rptr. 163, 168
(1980).
38Orion Ins. Co., Ltd. v. United Technologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas. 18,061,
18,062 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Bouvy-Loggers v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
15 Av. Cas. 17,153, 17,155 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Hudson's Bay & Annings, Ltd. v.
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 15 Av. Cas. 18,496 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1980).
"oAlcoa Steamship Co., Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 636 F.2d 860, 865 (2d
Cir. 1978); Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 503 (S.D.
N.Y.), aff'd, No. 80-7180 (2d Cir. June 13, 1980).
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and determined that plaintiffs had presented no evidence that they
would not receive a full and fair trial in the foreign forum. '
Although the applicable law in the alternative foreign forum
may be less favorable to the plaintiff's chance or amount of recov-
ery, the court nevertheless has discretion to apply the remedy of
dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens."1 The courts
have reasoned that a refusal to dismiss because of the prospect of
a less favorable recovery by plaintiffs "would emasculate the doc-
trine for a plaintiff rarely chooses to bring an action in a forum,
especially a foreign one, where he is less likely to recover."
4. The Applicable Factors
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,' the Supreme Court delineated the
factors to be considered under the doctrine of forum non conven-
iens. The factors were divided into those affecting the private
interests of the litigants and those in which the public had an in-
terest. The various factors are to be weighed by the court in order
to determine the "relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial,""
but "[u]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed."'
40 Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
af 'd, No. 80-7180 (2d Cir. June 13, 1980). Some courts have stated that if a con-
tingent fee arrangement did not exist in the proposed foreign forum, this would
bear some weight in the determination of whether such foreign forum was prac-
tically available to plaintiffs. However, when liability is conceded, this factor
would not be entitled to consideration since plaintiffs would be ensured a fund
from which to pay attorneys' fees. See Bouvy-Loggers v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., 15 Av. Cas. 17,153, 17,155 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
" Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 50 U.S.L.W. 4055 (1981); Pain v. United
Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Alcoa Steamship Co.,
Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 636 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1978) (prospect of $8
million recovery in New York limited to $570,000 in Trinidad); Orion Ins. Co.
v. United Technologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas. 18,061, 18,062 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(availability of strict liability claim in New York, but not in Great Britain);
Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd,
No. 80-7180 (2d Cir. June 13, 1980); Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448,
453 (2d Cir. 1975) (application of English general maritime law would entitle
defendant to judgment as matter of law); Canada Malting Co., Ltd. v. Paterson
Steamships, 285 U.S. 413, 418-20 (1932). Cf. Macedo v. The Boeing Co., No.
79C2498, slip. op. at 4 (2d Cir. Jan. 25, 1980) (court's dismissal was conditioned
upon the availability of meaningful remedies in the foreign forum).
Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 453 (2d Cir. 1975).
330 U. S. 501 (1947).
4id. at 508.
45 Id.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
a. Private Interests
The factors relating to the private interests of the litigants enum-
erated by the court in Gulf Oil Corp. are:
The relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforceability
of a judgment if one is obtained.4"
Although relatively simple to articulate, the doctrine is complex
in application and "leaves much to the discretion of the court to
which plaintiff resorts." As previously noted, in recent years the
courts frequently have invoked the doctrine to dismiss cases involv-
ing accidents or collisions occurring outside of the United States
that could be more conveniently litigated in a foreign forum.'
Recent cases have concluded that when the preponderance of
evidence concerning the issues of liability and damages is located
in a foreign forum, the balance weighs strongly in favor of defen-
dant and decisively against plaintiff's choice of forum." In an ac-
tion arising out of an accident occurring outside the United States,
certain demonstrative and documentary evidence may be located
in the foreign forum. This evidence may include:
1. the wreckage and component parts of the wreckage;
2. the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder;
3. the aircraft maintenance, operational and flight records;
4. the records concerning the flight crews' training and qualifica-
tions;
5. the investigative reports rendered by the foreign government.




48 See note 12 supra.
49 Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 506 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), af0'd, No. 80..7180 (2d Cir. June 13, 1980).
5 In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 50 U.S.L.W. 4055, 4061 (1981), the Court
held that the requirement of clearly specifying the witnesses to be called and
the nature of their testimony for a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) was in-
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1. government officials who investigated the accident;
2. survivors of the accident;
3. witnesses to the accident or persons familiar with the crash site;
4. employees of the foreign airline;
5. maintenance and service personnel;
6. damage witnesses if the plaintiffs are foreign citizens or resi-
dents;
7. persons familiar with the meteorological conditions;
8. air traffic controllers and airport personnel.
In aviation litigation, plaintiffs usually seek recovery under theo-
ries of strict products liability, negligence and breach of warran-
ty, alleging that the crash aircraft and its component parts were
defectively designed and manufactured. Documentary evidence lo-
cated within the United States respecting these theories may in-
clude the aircraft's design and manufacture records, testing records
and governmental certification records. Testimonial evidence lo-
cated within the United States may involve witnesses familiar with
the design and manufacturing process, governmental employees fa-
miliar with the testing and certification of the aircraft, and damages
witnesses if plaintiffs are American citizens or residents. Despite
the existence of such evidence within the United States, the exis-
tence of a preponderance of the evidence outside the United States
will militate in favor of a foreign forum. 1
In recent cases, the courts have further concluded that when
many of the non-party witnesses reside in a foreign forum, the in-
ability of a United States court to compel the attendance of such
persons operates in favor of a foreign forum." In such circumstanc-
applicable to a forum non conveniens dismissal. See notes 175-79 infra and
accompanying text.
11 See Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 506 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aff'd, No. 80-7180 (2d Cir. June 13, 1980); Grodinsky v. Fairchild Indus.,
Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1245, 1250 (D. Md. 1981). But see Petroleum Helicopters
de Columbia, S.A. v. Textron, Inc., 15 Av. Cas. 18,112 (D.D.C. 1980). Plaintiff,
a Columbian corporation with headquarters in Columbia, alleged that the tail
rotor drive shaft of the helicopter was defective and sought recovery under theo-
ries of negligence, breach of warranty and strict products liability. Although the
helicopter crash occurred in Columbia and the maintenance work was performed
in Columbia, the court summarily concluded that dismissal on the ground of fo-
rum non conveniens was inappropriate. The court was persuaded by the following:
(1) the helicopter was designed and manufactured in the United States; and, (2)
the statute of limitations apparently would bar plaintiff from refiling its action in
Columbia.
1 Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas. 18,352, 18,354 (3d Cir. 1980);
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es the courts have reasoned that a defendant would be seriously pre-
judiced if the action went forward in the United States.' The in-
ability to compel process in the United States has been viewed as
a crucial impediment to a fair trial: "Certainly to fix the place of
trial at a point where litigants cannot compel personal attendance
and may be forced to try their cases on deposition, is to create a
condition not satisfactory to the court, jury or most litigants."5' A
plaintiff's claim that the evidence and witnesses relative to his var-
ious liability theories are located within the United States and like-
wise not subject to the compulsory process of a foreign forum may
be effectively rebutted by defendant's agreement to make all of the
witnesses and documents under its control available in the foreign
forum should the action be dismissed." Although not all relevant
evidence may be under defendant's control,"' defendant's offer to
produce such evidence under its control, coupled with its inability
to subpoena foreign documents and witnesses for trial in the
United States, points toward trial in the foreign forum." The court
in Dahl v. United Technologies Corp."' stated: "Undoubtedly, no
matter where the case is tried there will be some difficulty in ac-
cess to materials, but we believe that more relevant materials and
easier access to them will occur if the case is tried in Norway with
[defendant's] agreement to provide all necessary materials under its
control."5"
When liability is admitted or not contested by defendant and
plaintiffs are citizens and residents of foreign countries, the courts
Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), af0'd,
No. 80-7180 (2d Cir. June 13, 1980); Macedo v. The Boeing Co., 15 Av. Cas.
18,032, 18,034 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
11 Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
afj'd, No. 80-7180 (2d Cir. June 13, 1980).
54 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 511 (1947).
" See Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas. 18,352, 18,354 (3d Cir.
1980); Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 506 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aff'd, No. 80-7180 (2d Cir. June 13, 1980); Grodinsky v. Fairchild Indus.,
Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1245, 1250 (D. Md. 1981).
56 An example of this would be when various witnesses are no longer employed
by defendant.
5 See Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas. 18,352, 18,354 (3d Cir.
1980); Grodinsky v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1245, 1250 (D. Md.
1981).
51 15 Av. Cas. 18,352 (3d Cir. 1980).
59 Id.
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recently have shown an inclination to invoke the doctrine of
forum non conveniens." In Bouvy-Loggers v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., "' the plaintiff, a citizen of the Netherlands, com-
menced an action in the Federal District Court in New York for
the wrongful death of her Dutch spouse in the collision between a
Pan Am 747 aircraft and a KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 747 air-
craft at Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Canary Islands, Spain." The sole
issue in the litigation was the amount of the plaintiff's damages,
since Pan Am's and KLM's agreement not to contest liability if
the plaintiff would waive any claims for punitive damages was ac-
cepted by plaintiff.' The court noted that the witnesses and docu-
ments with regard to this issue were located in the Netherlands and
concluded that the balance of conveniences weighed heavily to-
ward dismissal." The court stated:
The public interest also weighs heavily toward the conduct of this
litigation in The Netherlands and against its continuation in New
York. While this forum has some interest in protecting its resident
defendants, the fact that defendants are New York domiciliaries is
not alone sufficient to warrant the court's retention of an action.
... Here, The Netherlands has a strong interest in insuring that
this Dutch decedent's heirs are adequately compensated, for if they
are not, it is The Netherlands and its citizens who will bear the fi-
nancial responsibility for supporting them."
A court may find that it should not retain jurisdiction because
it may be necessary or appropriate for the jury to see the accident
site. This may be true even though plaintiffs are pursuing a pro-
ducts liability case. In Macedo v. The Boeing Co., " arising out of
the crash of a Transportes Aereos Portugueses airliner on landing
at Funchal Airport, Madeira Islands, Portugal, the court stated
that "all of the circumstances that surrounded the crash are rele-
60 See Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Bouvy-Loggers v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 15 Av. Cas. 17,153 (S.D.
N.Y. 1978).





6 15 Av. Cas. 18,032 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
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vant," including runway conditions, topography and weather."
The inability to implead other parties directly involved in the
controversy also weighs against a retention of jurisdiction in the
United States."' For example, the foreign owner or operator of the
aircraft may not be subject to personal jurisdiction in the United
States, thus precluding the defendant from impleading such a party.
In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno," the Court concluded that defend-
ant's inability to implead another potentially liable party, a foreign
air taxi service, would make litigation in the United States more
burdensome.1
Practical problems encountered in the trial of cases involving
evidence in other countries include translation of foreign docu-
ments and testimony of foreign witnesses," and the evaluation of
damages to be awarded to a foreign resident. ' Although such fac-
tors alone do not justify dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds, the courts have accorded them weight in the exercise of
their discretion." Since translation may pose linguistic difficulties
wherever the trial is held, the court may explicitly place the burden
of translation of the evidentiary documents which the defendant
has consented to produce on the defendant."2
b. Public Interests
Factors in which the public has an interest, enumerated by the
court in Gulf Oil Corp., are:
Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled
up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury
duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of
1 Id. at 18,034.
"'See also Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 454 (2d Cir. 1975); Del
Rio v. Ballenger Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (D.S.C. 1975).
"Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas. 18,352, 18,354 (3d Cir. 1980);
Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 453 (2d Cir. 1975).
7 50 U.S.L.W. 4055 (1981).
71 Id. at 4061-62.
72 Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas. 18,352, 18,354 (3d Cir.
1980).
11 Del Rio v. Ballenger Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1002 (D.S.C. 1975).
"See Papageorgiou v. Lloyds of London, 436 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
7 Dahi v. United Technologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas. 18,352, 18,354-55 (3d Cir.
1980).
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a community which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which
touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the
trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the
country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local
interest in having localized controversies decided at home. There
is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial in a diversity case in
a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the
case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle
problems in conflict of laws and in laws foreign to itself.'
In determining whether to invoke the doctrine, the courts have
focused their attention on the following:
1. Whether the docket of the United States court in which the ac-
tion is brought is congested;"'
2. Whether the lawsuit should be tried to a jury in a community
that bears no relation to the litigation;
3. Whether the local controversy should be decided close to
home;"9
'e Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
n Paper Operations Consultants Int'l., Ltd. v. S. S. Hong Kong Amber, 513
F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1975); Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490,
507 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), af/'d, No. 80-7180 (2d Cir. June 13, 1980); Macedo v. The
Boeing Co., 15 Av. Cas. 18,032, 18,034 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Mitchell v. General
Motors Corp., 439 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
78 Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
("Perhaps the most striking feature of this case is the lack of any significant con-
tacts between the event in dispute and the forum chosen by the plaintiffs in which
to litigate the consequences of that event."); Dahl v. United Technologies Corp.,
15 Av. Cas. 18,352, 18,355 (3d Cir. 1980); Fosen v. United Technologies Corp.,
484 F. Supp. 490, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), alf'd, No. 80-7180 (2d Cir. June 13,
1980) ("Not only is the Southern District of New York the quintessential 'con-
gested center,' but no element of this lawsuit is related to New York in any
way."); Macedo v. The Boeing Co., 15 Av. Cas. 18,032, 18,034 (N.D. Ill. 1980);
Orion Ins. Co., Ltd. v. United Technologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas. 18,061 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) ("[t]he congested dockets of the Southern District and our citizen jurors
can ill afford the burdens of a litigation unrelated to this forum."); Smith Kline
Corp. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 52 (D. Del. 1975); Del Rio v. Ballen-
ger Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1002 (D.S.C. 1975); Domingo v. State Marine Lines,
Inc., 340 F. Supp. 811, 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("I see no reason why this court,
with its heavy burdens and responsibilities, should be burdened with cases like
these which, from every point of view, should be tried in the courts of the nation
where all the relevant events occurred and whose own citizens are primarily in-
volved. Certainly this district in the Metropolitan area in which it is situated
has no conceivable relation to this litigation except for the fact that the de-
fendant happens to be doing business here.")
71 Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Macedo v. The Boeing Co., 15 Av. Cas. 18,032, 18,034 (N.D. Ill. 1980). In
Macedo, the court stated:
The fact that the aircraft was manufactured in the United States
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4. Whether foreign law will be applied."
In many recent cases, the courts have exhibited a strong ten-
dency to put great emphasis on the public interest factors where
the forum selected by the plaintiff has absolutely no nexus with the
litigation. In Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., "1 four wrongful
death actions arising out of the crash of a helicopter in the icy
waters of the North Atlantic were brought against United Tech-
nologies Corporation, the manufacturer of the helicopter. These
actions were filed in the federal district court in Delaware, United
Technologies' state of incorporation. Plaintiffs were residents and
citizens of Norway and United Technologies' principal place of
business was in Connecticut. The court dismissed plaintiffs' action
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens and stated, "The com-
mitment of Delaware judicial time and resources to this case is not
justified by any nexus Delaware has with what is essentially a Nor-
does not make the accident, involving a Portuguese airline, an air-
port in Portugal, predominantly Portuguese plaintiffs and Portu-
guese witnesses, any less a matter of local Portuguese interest.
Plaintiffs cannot, by characterizing their causes of action as pro-
ducts liability claims, eliminate the very intimate relation of Portu-
gal to the accident; the products liability claims arise in the context
of a Portuguese accident.
15 Av. Cas. at 18,032. See also Bouvy-Loggers v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., 15 Av. Cas. 17,153, 17,154 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) where the court stated:
"Here, the Netherlands has a strong interest in insuring that this Dutch decedent's
heirs are adequately compensated, for if they are not, it is the Netherlands and
its citizens who will bear the financial responsibility for supporting them." 15 Av.
Cas. at 17,154.
10 Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas. 18,352, 18,355 (3d Cir.
1980); Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 505 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), afl'd, No. 80-7180 (2d Cir. June 13, 1980) ("Although it is not de-
terminative, choice of law may be an important consideration in resolving a
motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens."); Orion Ins. Co., Ltd. v.
United Technologies Corp., 15 Av. Cas. 18,061, 18,062 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Bouvy-
Loggers v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 15 Av. Cas. 17,153, 17,155 (S.D.
N.Y. 1978); Mitchell v. General Motors Corp., 439 F. Supp. 24, 27 (N.D. Ohio
1977); Papageorgioa v. Lloyds of London, 436 F. Supp. 701, 703, (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Del Rio v. Ballenger Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (D.S.C. 1975); J. F. Pritchard
& Co. v. Dow Chemical, 331 F. Supp. 1125 (W.D. Mo. 1971). The courts have
held that "dismissal may not be avoided by the assertion of a palpably specious
and legally baseless claim" that appears to be governed by American law since
"plaintiff could avoid dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds by the inclusion
of a substantive count based on American law regardless of the merits of that
claim." 15 Av. Cas. at 18,355.
11 15 Av. Cas. 18,352 (3d Cir. 1980).
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wegian case."'" When an accident or collision occurs outside the
United States, our courts will not permit the very intimate relation
of the foreign country to the accident be eliminated simply by
plaintiffs' characterization of the claim as one for products lia-
bility.-
5. Application of the Doctrine in State Court
The state courts have followed the lead of the federal courts and
have applied liberally the forum non conveniens doctrine. Both
California and New York, where a large percentage of all aviation
disaster litigation is conducted, have codified and liberally applied
the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens." The factors
that guide the discretion of the California and New York state
courts in applying the doctrine are generally the same as those set
forth in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert."
a. California
California's forum non conveniens doctrine, which is of com-
mon law origin," is codified in California Code of Civil Procedure
Section 410.30(a): 1
When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that
in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a
forum outside the state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action
in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just."'
The philosophy behind the state doctrine, like the federal doctrine,
is equitable in nature, "embracing the discretionary power of a
court to decline to exercise the jurisdiction it has over a transitory
cause of action when it believes that the action before it may be
more appropriately and justly tried elsewhere."
'- Id. at 18,355. See also Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775,
781 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
11 Macedo v. The Boeing Co., 15 Av. Cas. 18,032, 18,034 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
'
4 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §410.30 (West 1973); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw
§327 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
- 330 U.S. 501 (1947). See Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp.
490, 503 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, No. 80-7180 (2d Cir. June 13, 1980).
"M Goodwine v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 2d 481 (1965); Price v. Atchison T. &
S.F. Ry. Co., 42 Cal. 2d 577 (1954).
8T CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §410.30 (West 1973).
88 Id.
11 Leet v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 609 (1944).
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Unlike the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens,* however,
the court has no discretion, except under extraordinary circum-
stances,"' to dismiss an action brought by a California resident
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens." As stated by one
California court, "[t]his limitation of the forum non conveniens
doctrine does not rest on any conclusion derived from a balancing
of conveniences; it reflects an overriding state policy of assuring
California residents an adequate forum for the redress of griev-
ances.""3 Although the court lacks the power to dismiss an action
brought by a California resident, it may stay such action under the
traditional forum non conveniens balancing analysis." The courts
reason that by staying the action, a California court is not divested
of jurisdiction and may properly protect the interests of a Califor-
nia resident, pending a final decision in the foreign forum."
90 See notes 24-30 supra and accompanying text.
"1Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels, 15 Cal. 3d 853, 859 (1973). In Archibald,
the court stated:
The exceptional case which justifies the dismissal of a suit under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens is one in which California cannot
provide an adequate forum or has no interest in doing so. Ex-
amples would include cases in which no party is a California resi-
dent.., or in which the nominal California resident sues on behalf
of foreign beneficiaries or creditors.
15 Cal. 3d at 859.
12Id. at 858. See Ferreira v. Ferreira, 9 Cal. 3d 824, 837 (1973), where the
court stated: "In the ordinary case, the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not
permit the dismissal of an action itself, as distinguished from a stay of that action,
brought by a California resident." See also Thomson v. Continental Ins. Co., 66
Cal. 2d 738, 742 (1967) ("Forum non conveniens has only an extremely limited
application to a case where as here, the plaintiff is a bonafide resident of the
forum state."); Goodwine v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 2d 481, 485 (1965) ("[A]
determination that a plaintiff is domiciled here would ordinarily preclude grant-
ing the defendant's motion for dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens.")
This policy is inapplicable, however, where the action is brought by a nominal
plaintiff, e.g., the resident administrator of the estate of a non-resident decedent.
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 3d 105, 111 (1970).
"'Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels, 15 Cal. 3d 853, 859 (1973).
04 1d. at 860.
Id. at 862. In Archibald, the court stated:
California's appetite for litigation must not be so gluttonous as to
compel it to engage in the trial of causes that are found by the court
of first resort to be more conveniently resolved elsewhere, since if
redress in the foreign jurisdiction proves abortive, California courts
retain the option to resume proceedings.
Id. at 862. See also Jagger v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 579, 589, where the
court stated: "Ordinarily dismissal is an exceptional remedy, and a stay the usual
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A further limitation on the court's discretion to dismiss under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens was noted by the court in
Brown v. Chlorox Co." In Brown, the plaintiff, a minor, brought an
action for damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of her
ingestion of a toxic product manufactured and sold by defendant."'
The court held that the trial court had abused its discretion in stay-
ing the plaintiff's action on the grounds of forum non conveniens
where the defendant companies were incorporated in California,
had maintained their principal place of business in California and
had conducted themselves in California so as to cause injury to
others in another state."
The factors to be considered in resolving a motion to dismiss
or stay on forum non conveniens grounds in California are gen-
erally the same as those enumerated by the court in Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert."' These factors have been articulated as follows:
The amenability of the parties to personal jurisdiction in this state
and in the alternative forum; the relative convenience to the parties
and trial witnesses of the competing forum; the differences in the
conflict of law rules applicable in the competing forum; the selec-
tion of a convenient, reasonable and fair place of trial; defendant's
principal place of business; the extent to which the cause of action
arose out of events related to this state; the extent to which any
party will be substantially disadvantaged by a trial in either forum;
the relative enforceability of judgments rendered in this state or in
the alternative forum; the relative inconvenience to witnesses and
relative expense to parties of proceedings in this state or the alter-
native forum; the significance and necessity of a view by the trier
of fact of physical evidence not conveniently moveable from the
alternative forum; the extent to which prosecution of the action in
this state would place a burden upon this state's judicial resources
equitably disproportionate to the relationship of the parties or
cause of action to this state; the extent to which the relationship
of the moving party to this state obligates him to participate in ju-
dicial proceedings here; this state's interest in providing a forum
one so that if obstacles develop to litigation in the convenient forum the parties
may resume litigation in California."
9656 Cal. App. 3d 306 (1976).
971d. at 308.
91 Id. at 313-14.
-330 U.S. 501 (1974). See Hemmelgarn v. The Boeing Co., 106 Cal. App. 3d
576, 584 (1980); Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels, 15 Cal. 3d 853, 860 (1973);
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 3d 105, 113-15 (1970).
1981]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
for some or all of the parties; this state's public interest in the liti-
gation; the avoidance of multiplicity of actions and inconsistent ad-
judications; the relative ease of access to sources of proof; the
availability of compulsory process for attendance of witnesses; the
relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial; the burden upon
jurors, local court and taxpayers of a jurisdiction having a minimal
relationship to the subject of the litigation; the difficulties and in-
conveniences to the defendant, the court and jurors incident to the
presentation of evidence by deposition; and the availability of the
suggested forum."'0
In balancing these factors, the court is required to make a qualita-
tive rather than a quantitative analysis "with heavy weight given
not only to plaintiff's choice of forum, but the effect of that choice
of forum on conflict of law rules and [California's] private and pub-
lic interest in the litigation.'. 1. The court may not consider the
convenience of counsel 10 or "the probability, if such exists, that
a California jury may be more generous in its awards than the
proper forum."..
The most recent California case to consider the doctrine of fo-
rum non conveniens as it relates to mass disaster aviation litigation
was Hemmelgarn v. The Boeing Co.' " In Hemmelgarn, wrongful
death actions were brought on behalf of Canadian decedents. The
actions arose out of the crash of a Boeing 737 aircraft at Cran-
brook Airport, British Columbia, Canada." The defendants, over
which the court had jurisdiction, included Rohr Industries, Inc.
(Rohr), a California resident and component parts manufacturer,
and The Boeing Company (Boeing), a Washington resident and
manufacturer of the aircraft."2 The California court had no juris-
diction over the Canadian defendants Pacific Western Airlines
(PWA), the government of Canada and the City of Cranbrook.'"
Boeing and the Canadian defendants subsequently entered into an
°
00Hemmelgarn v. The Boeing Co., 106 Cal. App. 3d 576, 584-85 (1980).
101 Id. at 586.
102Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 3d 105, 112
(1970).
103 Hemmelgarn v. The Boeing Co., 106 Cal. App. 3d 576, 585 (1980).
104 106 Cal. App. 3d 576 (1980).
10 Id. at 581.
'
0 2 Id. at 582.
101Id. at 589.
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agreement which authorized PWA to negotiate settlement of all
passenger claims in Canada and left the ultimate allocation of re-
sponsibility of fault for later resolution."8
The court in Hemmelgarn made two initial observations: the
majority of the forum non conveniens factors overwhelmingly fa-
vored a Canadian forum "' and examination of the factual under-
pinning of plaintiffs' claims revealed only a nominal connection
between Rohr and the facts relating to the accident. These findings
thwarted plaintiffs' claim that California had an overriding and
substantial state interest in applying its law to resident corporate
defendants who design or manufacture defective products in the
state."' More importantly, however, the court stated that in de-
termining whether "it is in the interest of substantial justice" to dis-
miss an action, the court must consider the governmental interest
affecting the relationship among defendants, such as California's
public policy considerations relating to the equitable apportion-
ment of liability among defendants in multi-party tort litigation.1
Although the court noted that Boeing and Rohr may not feel the
full sting of damages as computed in accordance with California
law, ' it concluded that retention of the cases would frustrate "Cal-
ifornia policy in multi-party tort litigation by reducing the possi-
bility of settlement and eliminating, or at least making more costly,
the equitable apportionment of damages based on comparative
fault among all responsible parties. 1 . Since trial of the cases in
108 Id. at 583.
109 Id. at 585-86.
110 Id. at 587.
"Iid. at 588.
112 d. Although the plaintiffs acknowledged that Canada had no statutory ceil-
ing on damages, they alleged that:
The elements of damages which may be considered in Canada will
necessarily result in lower damages there .... Unlike California,
Canada does not permit an allowance for further inflation in asses-
sing loss of future earnings and compensation for loss of society,
comfort and protection is either non-existent or outrageously low.
Further, in Canada lost earning damages are based on after tax in-
come and Canada requires substantial reductions for such contin-
gencies as future illness, prospective financial disasters, personality
defects, remarriage and inheritance.
Id. at 586-87.
111 Id. at 589. The court noted that "the likelihood of settlement is reduced
when all parties are not involved for there is always a tendency by the defendant
present at settlement discussion to point the finger at the missing defendant who
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Canada pursuant to the defendants' settlement agreement would
more fully satisfy California's public policy,"' the court affirmed
the trial court's dismissal of the actions on the condition that Boe-
ing and Rohr submit to the jurisdiction of the British Columbia
courts."'
b. New York
New York's forum non conveniens doctrine is codified in Rule
327 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules:
When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the
action should be heard in another forum, the court, on the motion
of any party, may stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on
any conditions that may be just. The domicile or residence in this
state of any party to the action shall not preclude the court from
staying or dismissing the action.'
This rule codifies the doctrine enuciated in Silver v. Great Ameri-
can Insurance Co.,' where the New York Court of Appeals re-
jected the long-standing rule that the residence in New York of
either party to an action barred a New York court from dismissing
the action on the grounds of forum non conveniens." Although the
residence of the parties remains an important factor for considera-
tion, the doctrine is applied based upon considerations of justice,
fairness and convenience. " Accordingly, dismissal "should be
granted when it plainly appears that New York is an inconvenient
forum and that another is available that will best serve the ends of
justice and the convenience of the parties.''.
The factors to be considered in resolving a motion to dismiss or
stay on forum non conveniens grounds in New York are generally
the same as those delineated by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil
invariably is described as the real culprit without whom the case cannot be re-
solved." Id.
"'The settlement agreement provided that indemnity would be based upon
the respective fault of the parties. Id.
"
1 Hemmelgarn v. The Boeing Co., 106 Cal. App. 3d 576, 581 (1980).
"'N.Y. Cv. PRAC. LAw §327 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
117 Id.
11829 N.Y.2d 356, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398, 278 N.E.2d 619 (1972).
119 Id.
1 1 d. at 361, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 402, 278 N.E.2d at 622.
f'l Id.
DEFENDANT'S CHOICE OF FORUM
Corp. and subsequently applied by the federal courts.'22 These
factors include:
On the one hand the burden on New York courts and the extent
of any hardship to the defendant that prosecution of the suit would
entail and, on the other, such matters as the unavailability else-
where of a forum in which the plaintiff may obtain effective re-
dress and the extent to which the plaintiff's interest may other-
wise be properly served by pursuing his claim in this State."
3
In Varkonyi v. S. A. Empressa de Vicao Airea Rio Grandense,."
the plaintiffs,, who were residents of Hungary, Great Britain and
Florida, filed actions in the New York County Supreme Court for
wrongful death arising out of the crash of a Boeing 727 aircraft in
Lima, Peru."' The defendants included the airline, a corporation
chartered in Brazil but doing business in New York, and the man-
ufacturer of the aircraft, a corporation chartered in Delaware and
doing business in New York.'2' The defendants' motions to dismiss
on the ground of forum non conveniens were denied by the court
at special term."' The order of the intermediate appellate division
dismissing plaintiffs' complaints under the doctrine was reversed
by New York's highest tribunal, since the appellate division failed
to consider "special circumstances" that favored acceptance of the
lawsuit in New York."8 The actions were remitted to the appellate
division for consideration of the special circumstances, which in-
cluded the absence of any other forum in which all defendants
could be joined, and the presence of other wrongful death actions
arising from the same accident in the federal and state courts in
New York.'"
22See Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 503 n.8
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), a/f'd, No. 80-7180 (2d Cir. June 13, 1980); Schertenleib v.
Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1162 n.13 (2d Cir. 1978). In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501 (1947), the Supreme Court noted that "[tihe law of New York
as to the discretion of a court to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
and as to the standards that guide discretion is, so far as here involved, the
same as the Federal rule." Id. at 509.
23Varkonyi v. S. A. Empresa de Viacao Airea Rio Grandense, 22 N.Y.2d
333, 338, 292 N.Y.S.2d 670, 673, 239 N.E.2d 542, 544 (1968).
12422 N.Y.2d 333, 292 N.Y.S.2d 670, 239 N.E.2d 542 (1968).
"2 Id. at 336, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 72, 239 N.E.2d at 543.
12 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 338, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 674, 239 N.E.2d at 544.
" 'Id. For a discussion of Varkonyi and New York's "special circumstances"
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In Gettler v. Piper Aircraft Corp.," the plaintiff, a resident of
Connecticut, brought an action for damages for personal injuries
arising out of an aircraft accident that occurred in Rhode Island.1"'
The defendant, the manufacturer of the aircraft, was a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania." '
The only contacts which the litigation had with New York were
the presence of the plaintiff's attorney and the occurrence in New
York of one prior accident involving the same type of aircraft."'
The court granted defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds of
forum non conveniens, holding that this connection with New York
was "too tenuous particularly in view of the pendency in Connec-
ticut of actions by the passengers of the plane and others, who re-
side in that state."''
A recent New York aviation related case to apply the doctrine
is Hudson's Bay & Annings Ltd. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines.'
In Hudson's Bay, the plaintiff, a foreign corporation organized
under the laws of Great Britain with it's principal place of busi-
ness in England, brought an action for alleged water damage to
goods transported by air from Illinois to England via the Nether-
lands against defendant, a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the Netherlands.'" The court summarily concluded that
New York had no relationship to the issues of the case other than
the fact that defendant was amenable to process there and dis-
missed the action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.' "
rule see Note, Forum Non Conveniens-Non Resident Parties-Special Circum-
stances, 36 J. AIR LAw & COM. 759 (1970).
130 10 Av. Cas. 17,918 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1968).
"'Id. at 17,918-19.132 JId. at 17,919.
1331d.
I" Id. But see Boskoff v. The Boeing Co., 16 Av. Cas. 17,753 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
1981).
133 15 Av. Cas. 18,496 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1980).
13 Id.
11 Id. The courts dismissal was on the condition that defendant stipulate to
submit itself to jurisdiction and to waive any defense of statute of limitations or
lack of jurisdiction. See also Adipaz, Ltd. v. Swiss Air Transp., Ltd., 16 Av. Cas.
17,580 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1981); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 406
N.Y.S.2d 849, 64 A.D.2d 545 (1978). In Crown Cork, the court held that New
York was an inconvenient forum since all of the issues related to events in South
Africa, where by far the greatest number of witnesses were located, and it would
constitute an unnecessary burden on the New York courts to apply foreign law.
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The private interest factors that are to be weighed by the court in
applying the doctrine were not mentioned in the court's opinion.
6. Pitfalls, Traps and Other Opportunities
The doctrine presupposes the existence of an alternative forum.
While the significance of "alternative" has not been definitely set
forth, it apparently at least includes subject matter and personal
jurisdiction. Whether, in addition, it truly includes everything re-
quired to obtain effective redress is unknown at this time. One
prolific writer taking the plaintiff's viewpoint has consistently ob-
served:
The reality of international aviation is that there is no place out-
side of the United States where airline passengers can "obtain effec-
tive redress." In most nations they can't even get access to their
own goveniment's accident investigation data, and discovery is
practically non-existant [sic]; they can't get lawyers to represent
them on a contingent basis; they can't afford to pay the huge
hourly fees which would be rolled up in the absence of contingent
fees; they can't take the risk of being wiped out by a bill of costs
which would include the fees of all defendants' attorneys if they
lost; and they would have to break new grounds in attempting to
hold manufacturers liable for defective aviation products. "
Surely the doctrine does not require that, in addition to a forum,
foreign nationals must have all of the benefits of the most liberal
of American law in their own country. Some countries, for example,
forbid contingency fees, forbid agreements affecting foreign ex-
change, and require substantial deposits in court for the bringing
of lawsuits.' " While the effect of such rules of law may be to pre-
clude the bringing of a particular lawsuit by a particular plaintiff,
it cannot be said that an alternative forum does not exist. Ease of
access and likelihood of success are quite different from existence
of a proper court.
The defendant should always consider retention of an expert on
However, as a condition of the judgment of dismissal, defendant was required to
(1) waive any objection to subject matter jurisdiction in South Africa; (2) ac-
cept service of process in that jurisdiction; (3) waive objection to compulsory
process requiring appearance of witnesses and production of documents; (4) con-
sent to full faith and credit for any judgment obtained in South Africa; and (5)
waive any defense of limitation of time.
138 Speiser, From Roosevelt Field to Tenerife, 82 CASE & COMMENT, (1977).
139See e.g., INDIA CODE CIv. P.
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foreign law and should submit affidavits in support of the motion
to dismiss. In view of language in recent court opinions that the
alternative foreign forum should be "proper" or "suitable," the de-
fendant should be prepared to consent to personal jurisdiction and
to waive technical defenses such as statute of limitations, as well
as be prepared to sign letters guaranteeing payment of a judgment.
The defendant should also be prepared to answer arguments that
foreign courts will not afford foreign nationals due process in,
accordance with precepts of American law, even though they offer
them the full process of their own law. Of course, foreign nationals.
lacking the appropriate connection with the United States are not
entitled to due process of our laws at all. *
In showing that the balance weighs strongly in favor of a foreign
forum, the defendant should be prepared to identify all key issues
in the case in order to show that the evidence on those issues is.
located in a foreign country. This will require extensive legal re-
search and analytical efforts concerning the facts of the case at
bar. The defendant must show by issue and by witness the testi-
mony or documentary evidence sought to be elicited. A laundry
list of witnesses and their addresses invariably will prove insufficient.
Recent cases indicate that when liability is contested defendant's
consent to produce documents and witnesses under its control in
a foreign forum will be very useful and could well tip the scales in
favor of dismissal. The courts reason that by this device all litigants
have complete access to essential sources of proof. Where English
is not the major language of the foreign forum, the defendant
should also be prepared to offer translation of critical documents
at its own expense. When liability is admitted or uncontested and
the plaintiffs are neither American citizens nor American residents,
the defendant should remember that the court will be more favor-
ably inclined to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conven-
iens. In such circumstances, the only issue remaining is one of
damages, and witnesses as well as documents, in all likelihood, will
be located in a foreign forum. If the foreign country is not a signa-
tory to the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
or Commercial Matters,'" which permits the taking of evidence by
140 Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252, 254 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
141 Multilateral Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters, done March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444.
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deposition, or has no law similar to title 28, section 1782, of the
United States Code1" which allows a district court in the United
States to order persons to give testimony for use in foreign pro-
ceedings, this, of course, is yet another reason to press for dis-
missal." A powerful showing of diligent but unsuccessful effort
to obtain evidence in a foreign country will be most useful in sup-
porting the motion to dismiss, especially when due process is denied
an American domiciliary by its inability to obtain and present evi-
dence necessary to establish its own defense.'"
'228 U.S.C. § 1782 (1976).
11 In Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
the court noted the multifarious problems in obtaining foreign evidence as fol-
lows:
We recognize, of course, that some of the necessary documents and
testimony could be obtained from abroad through the channels of
international judicial assistance which have been negotiated in con-
juction with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While these me-
chanisms exist, however, they are far from perfect. If trial were to
be conducted here, significant procedural obstacles might limit the
availability of foreign discovery to the parties. The Hague Conven-
tion on the Taking of Evidence Abroad to which the United States,
France, Norway, and Great Britain are all signatories specifies that
when a party fails to secure a witness' voluntary cooperation by
notice or commission procedure, it may seek discovery via a letter
rogatory-a letter of request from an American judge for the assis-
tance of a foreign judicial authority. Although the Hague Evidence
Convention provides a mechanism whereby the recipient nation's
executing authority is required to assist an American court with
such compulsory force as its own courts can exercise in a pretrial
evidentiary situation, numerous exceptions to this international ob-
litigation exist, which potentially bar this device from being exe-
cuted at all. For example, foreign judicial cooperation may be with-
held altogether if the discovery assistance requested is deemed pre-
judicial to state sovereignty.
Furthermore, even when discovery abroad is available, the breadth
of evidence ordinarily expected from a full-fledged American-style
deposition might be constricted for any number of reasons. The for-
eign state's own procedures might limit or foreclose cross-examina-
tion, full participation of counsel might not be allowed, or a ver-
batim record might not result, thus limiting admissibility of the
testimony in an American court. The scope of foreign privilege
might prove broader under the letter rogatory procedure than under
either local law or American law, and in some cases, official trans-
lators might be required for each piece of paper involved. Regard-
less of whether or not foreign evidence would be as fully available
were trial to be conducted here, there can be little doubt that the
cost to the litigants of employing such procedures.would be exceed-
ingly high.
637 F.2d at 782 (citations omitted).
'4 The right to a fair hearing and to be heard at a meaningful time in a
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The inability to implead other parties directly involved in the
controversy is also a factor that requires serious consideration by
the defendant. When a non-joined party such as a foreign airline
is critically involved, inability to join that party weighs in favor of
dismissal as much as ability to join the third party militates against
it. The decision to join the third party often will turn on economic
considerations such as the threatened bringing of a hull subroga-
tion lawsuit. Where the action has been brought in admiralty under
the Death on The High Seas Act,1" impleading may be unnecessary
if damages recovered are allowed to be reduced by the amount of
percentage responsibility assigned to the absent defendant.1"
Practical problems which make trial of a lawsuit in the United
States less expeditious and more expensive should be stressed. For
example, obtaining evidence in Third World countries, half way
around the world, in multiple languages is an expensive, time con-
suming and often unproductive process. In addition, translation of
documents and testimony can be an awesome burden for American
domiciliaries to be forced to undertake.
Application of foreign law can be critically important to a con-
sideration by the court; therefore, it behooves the defendant to
undertake a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the conflict
of laws and foreign law involved. Invariably, the defendant should
not only attempt to show that foreign law does apply but also that
the court will be required to use principles of jurisprudence with
which it is not familiar and to interpret concepts and rules which
it may find altogether quite offensive. Determination of the ap-
plicable law may be a tortuous and complicated process. Lament-
ably, some courts discharge their obligation in this regard simply
by throwing up their hands and choosing the law with which they
meaningful manner are incorporated into the due process guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). The Supreme Court has held that in order to
be heard in a meaningful manner, "due process requires that there be an oppor-
tunity to present every available defense." Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66
(1972). See American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932); Hardy
v. Gassendaner, 508 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1975).
1-46 U.S.C. § 761-767 (1976).
146See generally United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., Inc., 421 U.S. 397
(1975); Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc., 592 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1979);
Doyle v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 701 (D.S.C. 1977); Fruge v. Dampsen Drill-
ing Co., 423 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. La. 1976).
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have the greatest familiarity. Equally easy, of course, would be
dismissal of the action.
B. Forum Non Conveniens-Transfer
1. History
Prior to 1948 the federal courts had no power to transfer an
action to a more convenient forum. The only remedy available
was dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In or-
der to mitigate this harsh result, yet preserve forum non conveniens
as a vehicle of judicial administration, Congress enacted Section
1404(a) of the Judicial Code." The statute provides, "for the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought. ' "
Although section 1404(a) was "drafted in accordance with the
doctrine of forum non conveniens,.'. 9 the Supreme Court in Nor-
wood v. Kirkpatrick"' concluded that the statute was not merely a
codification of the forum non conveniens doctrine and stated:
Congress, in writing 1404(a), which was an entirely new section,
was revising as well as codifying .... When the harshest part of
the doctrine (dismissal) is excised by statute, it can hardly be
called mere codification. As a consequence, we believe that Con-
gress... intended to permit courts to grant transfers upon a lesser
showing of inconvenience. This is not to say that the relevant fac-
tors have changed or that the plaintiff's choice of forum is not to
be considered, but only that the discretion to be exercised is broad-
er.15'
Like the doctrine of forum non conveniens, section 1404(a) has
been construed to apply to proceedings in admiralty as well as to
ordinary civil actions.'
2. Limitations on the Doctrine
Section 1404(a) specifies that an action may be transferred to
14T 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
1
48 Id.
149 1 J. Moore, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE, 200-11 (1949).
1 349 U.S. 29 (1955).
151 Id. at 32.
"' See Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL 585, 364 U.S. 19 (1960); Cessna
Aircraft Co. v. Brown, 348 F.2d 689, 691 (10th Cir. 1965).
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any other district court "where it might have been brought." Prior
to 1960 the federal courts permitted transfer to a district where
jurisdiction and venue were improper, if the defendant sought trans-
fer and consented to such jurisdiction and venue."' In Hoffman v.
Blaski,"" however, the Supreme Court severely restricted the scope
of section 1404(a) and held that the statute authorized transfer
only to a district in which jurisdiction over the defendant could
have been obtained and venue was proper at the time suit was com-
menced, regardless of defendant's consent.'
The phrase "where the action might have been brought" was
further construed by the Supreme Court in Van Dusen v. Bar-
rack.'" In Van Dusen the Court held that this phrase referred only
to defendant's "suability" under the federal laws of venue, service
and jurisdiction, and not to the capacity of plaintiff to bring an
action, which was governed by state law.m'
3. The Applicable Factors
a. Introduction
The factors to be applied under section 1404(a) are essentially
the same as those enumerated by the Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert.' A lesser showing of inconvenience, however, is required
under 1404(a) than is necessary under the doctrine of forum non
'13 Comment, Federal Transfer: Problems of Multiple Litigation and the In-
applicability of Stare Decisis, 34 J. Am L. & CoM. 621, 623 (1968) [hereinafter
referred to as Federal Transfer].
1- 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
155 Id. at 343. The court, citing Paramount Pictures Inc. v. Rodney, 186 F.2d
111 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 953 (1951), stated:
But we do not see how the conduct of a defendant after suit has
been instituted can add to the forums where 'it might have been
brought.' In the normal meaning of words this language of Section
1404(a) directs the attention of the judge who is considering a
transfer to the situation which existed when suit was instituted.
363 U.S. at 343. See Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Brown, 348 F.2d 689, 691-92 (10th
Cir. 1965).
158376 U.S. 612 (1964).
157 Id. at 621. See Farrell v. Wyatt, 408 F.2d 662, 665-66 (2d Cir. 1969).
158 330 U.S. 501 (1947). See also Humphreys v. Tann, 13 Av. Cas. 18,229,
18,233 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Berger v. Winer Sportswear, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1110,
1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F.
Supp. 746, 748 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); Glenn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 210 F.
Supp. 31, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); Cressman v. United Airlines, 158 F. Supp. 404,
407 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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conveniens,"9 while the discretion to be exercised by the courts
under 1404(a) is broader.'
In Popkin v. Eastern Airlines,1' a Pennsylvania district court
stated:
A motion to transfer is not susceptible to an exact weighing. The
relevant factors remain too vague in application and the value to
which they are entitled is at best a calculated guess .... Since dis-
trict judges have not been endowed with Solomonic wisdom we
must be content with an inexact balancing.'
In Wright v. American Flyers Airlines Corp. 1" a South Carolina
district court stated, "[tihe burden is upon the movant to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the transfer will serve more
conveniently the interests of the parties and witnesses and promote
the ends of justice."'" A showing of inconvenience to the defendant
is insufficient to warrant transfer where it would merely shift the
inconvenience to the other parties."
b. Plaintifi's Choice of Forum
In construing section 1404(a) the courts have recognized that
although the plaintiff does not have an absolute right to the choice
of forum his choice is a factor to be considered and, when other
factors are equally balanced, his choice is determinative.'" When
'Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955); Scaramuzzo v. American
Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 746, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
'"Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955); Popkin v. Eastern Air-
lines, Inc. 253 F. Supp. 244, 246 (E.D. Pa. 1966); United States v. United Air-
lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 715 (E.D. Wash., D.Nev., 1962); Glenn v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc. 210 F. Supp. 31, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
... 253 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
162 Id. at 25 1.
.'. 263 F. Supp. 865 (D.S.C. 1967).
vmId. at 867. See Popkin v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 244, 246 (E.
D. Pa. 1966); Rodgers v. North West Airlines, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 309, 312 (S.D.
N.Y. 1962); Cressman v. United Airlines, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 404, 407 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
"I Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers Airlines Corp., 260 F. Supp. 746, 747 (E.
D.N.Y. 1966); Schmidt v. American Flyers Airlines Corp., 260 F. Supp. 813, 815
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
1. Wright v. American Flyers Airlines Corp., 263 F. Supp. 865, 867 (D.S.C.
1967). See also Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329, 330 (2d Cir. 1950)("Plaintiff's privilege, conferred by statute, of choosing the forum he selected is a
factor to be considered."); Humphreys v. Tann, 13 Av. Cas. 18,229, 18,233 (E.
D. Mich. 1976) ("Plaintiff's choice of forum bears considerable weight."); Schin-
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the plaintiff's action is brought in his district of residence, the
plaintiff's choice of forum becomes a very relevant consideration
in weighing the disadvantages to the defendant."" When the plain-
tiff's action is filed in a district which is not his residence or in a
district which has no connection with the litigation, however, the
plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to substantially less consider-
ation."8 In Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Igoe,"'
the court stated that the plaintiff's choice of forum "has minimal
value where none of the conduct complained of occurred in the
forum selected by plaintiff..... The plaintiff's choice of forum is
also given less weight when he has freely chosen a different forum
in the first instance. 1"
c. Convenience of Parties and Witnesses
In balancing the convenience of parties and witnesses in avia-
delheim v. Braniff Airways, 202 F. Supp. 313, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ("Plaintiff's
choice of forum must be given substantial weight."); Cressman v. United Airlines,
158 F. Supp. 404, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ("Plaintiff's choice of a forum is a sig-
nificant factor to be considered").
167 Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 746, 748 (E.
D.N.Y. 1966); Popkin v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 244, 246 (E.D. Pa.
1966). See also Calva v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 238 (D. Minn.
1959), where the court stated that "the bringing of a suit in the district where the
plaintiff permanently resides is of substantial importance in counter-balancing
the arguments for transfer of venue." Id. at 239. But see Cross v. American Air-
lines, Inc., 5 Av. Cas. 18,178 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). In Cross, the court transferred
an action brought in the district where plaintiff resided and stated:
Overwhelming balance of convenience of witnesses and parties, as
well as sound and efficient judicial administration, dictates the trans-
fer of these two actions to the Northern District of Oklahoma where
this large number of cases involving the same crash are pending
and will be determined, where the principal acts and omissions al-
leged to constitute negligence took place, where those who partici-
pated in such acts reside and work.
5 Av. Cas. at 18,180.
168 Thompson v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y.
1963); Glenn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 31, 33 (E.D.N.Y.
1962); Rodgers v. North East Airlines, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y.
1962); Cressman v. United Airlines, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 404, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
See also Quandt v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1009, 1012 (D. Del. 1970).
169 220 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1955).
170 Id. at 304. See also Pacific Car & Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 954
(9th Cir. 1968); Xerox Corp. v. Litton Ind., 353 F. Supp. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
17 Merrill v. National Airlines, Inc., 8 Av. Cas. 17,192 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). In
Merrill, plaintiff originally filed wrongful death actions in the Pennsylvania state
courts. After the actions had been removed to federal court by defendants, plain-
tiffs refiled identical actions in the Southern District of New York. Id.
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tion litigation, the courts examine both the issue of liability and
damages.'" Thus, where the plaintiffs or their decedents are resi-
dents of the district and the preponderance of evidence on the is-
sue of damages is located in the plaintiffs' selected forum, some
courts have concluded that trial may more conveniently proceed in
that district." The issue of damages in aviation tort litigation, how-
ever, has been recognized to consume far less time than the issue
of liability."' Thus the convenience of witnesses testifying to such
issues should generally be accorded less weight than convenience
of witnesses testifying to liability.
It is well settled that a mere listing of the names and addresses
of the witnesses that may be required to testify at trial is insufficient
to establish that a transfer based on the convenience of the wit-
nesses is appropriate.'" As stated by a District of Columbia court,
"A defendant moving to transfer on the basis of the convenience
of the witnesses must meet its burden of persuasion with precise
information. 1.. The courts have required that the defendant iden-
tify the key liability issues, the key witnesses relative to these is-
sues, the nature of the testimony reasonably anticipated from these
witnesses, and how such testimony is relevant or necessary to the
key liability issues.'" If the court discerns that the importance of
the identified witnesses' testimony is questionable, such witnesses
" 
2 Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers Airlines Corp., 260 F. Supp. 746, 749 (E.D.
N.Y. 1966); Schindelheim v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 313, 315-16
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
173 See Schindelheim v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 313, 315 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
'1 Glenn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 31, 35 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
IT United Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 795, 796 (D. Del.
1959).
"I Petroleum Helicopters De Columbia S.A. v. Textron, Inc., 15 Av. Cas.
18,112, 18,113 (D.D.C. 1980). In Petroleum the court allowed defendant a fur-
ther opportunity to support his transfer motion "with affidavits identifying partic-
ular potential witnesses, specific categories of documents, and their current where-
abouts" since the forum selected by plaintiff had no real contact with the opera-
tive facts underlying the controversy and it appeared likely that transfer would
serve the convenience of the witnesses and parties. Id.
'See Schmidt v. American Flyers Airlines Corp., 260 F. Supp. 813, 814
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers Airlines Corp., 260 F. Supp.
746, 749 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); Popkin v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 244,
248 (E.D. Pa. 1966); United Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 795,
796 (D. Del. 1959).
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will be accorded little weight." The qualitative value of the testi-
mony of the liability witnesses, rather than the number of such wit-
nesses, is given greater weight in determining whether transfer will
serve the convenience of the witnesses. "
A defendant's ability to transfer on the basis of convenience of
the parties and witnesses is considerably greater if wrongful death
actions arising out of a foreign accident are brought by foreign
plaintiffs rather than American residents and citizens. In Quandt
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., * the plaintiffs, citizens and residents of
West Germany, brought a wrongful death action in the District of
Delaware, the defendant's state of incorporation, as a result of an
aircrash that occurred in Italy."' At the defendant's request, the
court transferred the action under section 1404(a) to the district
where the aircraft was manufactured and designed. The court con-
cluded that the balance of convenience to parties and to witnesses
tipped the scales in favor of transfer." The court noted that their
convenience would not be affected by the choice of forum because
the plaintiffs and any witnesses residing outside of the United States
would have extensive travel whether the case was tried in Delaware
or Kansas.''
The convenience of expert witnesses has been held not to be
determinative under section 1404(a) in balancing the convenience
of witnesses." Likewise, the convenience of counsel is not entitled
'
8 See Schmidt v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 813, 814-15
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Schindelheim v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 313, 316
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
"' Wright v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 263 F. Supp. 865, 867 (D.S.C.
1967); Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 746, 749
(E.D.N.Y. 1966); Popkin v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 244, 248 (E.D.
Pa. 1966).
180 317 F Supp. 1009 (D. Del. 1970).
'l Id. at 1013.
12 Id. at 1012. See also Petroleum Helicopters De Columbia S.A. v. Textron,
Inc., 15 Av. Cas. 18,112 (D.D.C. 1980), an action for property damage brought
by plaintiff, a Columbian corporation, arising out of the crash of a helicopter in
Columbia, South America. The Court intimated that transfer to the district where
the helicopter was designed and manufactured would likely serve the convenience
of the parties and witnesses. Id. at 18,113.
183 Quandt v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1009, 1011-12 (D. Del.
1970).
184 Id. at 1012. But see Heiser v. United Airlines, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.
N.Y. 1958).
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to consideration in weighing the balance under 1404(a)."' In
Cressman v. United Airlines,'" the court stated: "It will almost al-
ways be the case that the granting of a transfer motion will incon-
venience counsel in the transferor district or necessitate the engage-
ment of new counsel. Were this fact to be accorded much weight in
motions of this type, Section 1404(a) would be rendered virtually
nugatory.'
87
Under certain circumstances a defendant's offer to defray the
plaintiff's expenses in transferring forums may operate in favor of
transfer. 88 In Wright v. American Flyers Airline Corp.,'9 the court
concluded that the defendant's offer to minimize the inconvenience
that transfer would impose upon plaintiff by defraying the expense
of plaintiffs, their witnesses and their counsel, in conjunction with
admitted inconvenience to many of the liability witnesses, tipped
the scales in favor of transfer.'0 Where the balance of interest
weighs strongly in favor of plaintiff, however, a defendant's offer
to pay the plaintiff's expenses will have a much lesser effect."'
Some courts have concluded that when the liability witnesses
who are significant and who are allegedly inconvenienced are under
the defendant's control, this militates against transfer."" The courts
have simply reasoned that such witnesses could be transported to
"' Wright v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 263 F. Supp. 865, 867 n.4 (D.
S.C. 1967); Cressman v. United Airlines, 158 F. Supp. 404, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
"86 158 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
"87 Id. at 407. In Danon v. United States, 9 Av. Cas. 17,206 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
however, the defendants delayed 14 months in making a motion to transfer and
plaintiff's attorneys prepared for trial during this delay. The Court ordered that
the transfer motion under Section 1404(a) be granted conditioned upon defen-
dant's payment to plaintiff of reasonable attorney's fees for services performed by
New York counsel for plaintiff. For an argument that convenience of counsel
should be entitled to consideration by the courts, see Federal Transfer, supra note
153, at 627-28.
"8 For an analysis of when defendant's offer to defray plaintiff's expenses may
tip the scales in favor of transfer, see Federal Transfer, supra note 153, at 631-38.
189263 F. Supp. 865 (D.S.C. 1967).
1.0 Id. at 868. But see Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F.
Supp. 746, 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
"' See Federal Transfer, supra note 153, at 637-38.
"' Berger v. Winer Sportswear, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1110, 1119 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Schmidt v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 813, 814 (S.D.
N.Y. 1966); Schindelheim v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 313, 316 (S.D.
N.Y. 1962); Calva v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 238, 239-40 (D.
Minn. 1959).
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the forum selected by plaintiff at a minimum of inconvenience
and expense to the defendants, especially when the defendant is an
airline operator. "3 One court, however, has recognized that al-
though the defendant may be able to transport such witnesses un-
der its control at a minimum of inconvenience, such witnesses
themselves will be inconvenienced by trial in the forum selected by
plaintiff.9 '
d. Interest of Justice
In aviation tort litigation the primary factor the courts have con-
sidered in determining whether the interests of justice will be served
by transfer has been the effect of other pending actions. When other
actions arising from the same aircrash are pending in the district
selected by the plaintiff, or in the state courts encompassed within
that federal district, the courts have often concluded that this
weighs against transfer."" The court has been unable to discern how
the defendant would be prejudiced or inconvenienced when other
actions with nearly identical issues will be tried in either the same
forum selected by the plaintiff or a nearby forum.'" The possibility
of consolidation with related actions advances the strong public
"I Calva v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 238, 239-40 (D. Minn.
1959); Bush v. United Airlines, 148 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). In Calva,
the court stated: "The inequity arising from the disproportion in numbers of wit-
nesses expected to be presented by the parties is offset by reason of the defendant's
ability to bring its witnesses on its own planes and those of other carriers without
fare expense." 177 F. Supp. at 239-40.
In Bush, the court stated:
The defendant is engaged in an extensive nationwide business of
transporting passengers by air. In operating a business of this na-
ture, it is reasonable to expect the defendant to anticipate the haz-
ard and expense of suits filed against it at various points over the
territory in which it operates. Moreover, the defendant should ex-
pect that such suits will require the transportation of such of its
employees as it must call as witnesses to the places of trial. The
matter of the transportation of witnesses would pose a problem
more easily solved by the defendant than by the plaintiff. The for-
tuitous circumstances that this accident occurred through a collision
with a mountain in Wyoming should not operate to deprive the
plaintiff of her choice of forum.
148 F. Supp. at 105.
194 Glenn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 31, 35 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
'10 Berger v. Winer Sportswear, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1110, 1119 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Smith v. Quanci, 11 Av. Cas. 17,132, 17,133 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Heiser v.
United Airlines, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 237, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
" Heiser v. United Airlines, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 237, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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policy of avoiding duplicitous litigation and inconsistent determi-
nations, and thus represents a preferable alternative to transfer in
such situations."' On the other hand, when many other actions aris-
ing from the same aircrash are pending in the proposed transferee
forum, the courts have often concluded that this operates in
favor of transfer.' Transfer, in such circumstances, will accom-
plish the strong policy favoring the litigation of related claims in the
same tribunal.'" In addition, the possible consolidation in the trans-
feree forum will serve the interests of expediency and will lessen
the expense to the courts and the parties."'
Despite the presence of other actions pending in the proposed
transferee forum, some courts have concluded that this does not
necessarily operate in favor of transfer.2"' These courts have reached
their conclusion for the following reasons: (1) the transferee
court may not necessarily consolidate the actions;2 (2) actions
pending in other districts may not necessarily be transferred to the
197 Smith v. Quanci, 11 Av. Cas. 17,132, 17,133 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
" Wright v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 263 F. Supp. 865, 869-70 (D.S.
C. 1967); Rodgers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 309, 312-13 (S.D.
N.Y. 1962); Cressman v. United Airlines, 158 F. Supp. 404, 407 (S.D.N.Y.
1958); Cross v. American Airlines, 5 Av. Cas. 18,178, 18,179 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
See also Farrell v. Wyatt, 408 F.2d 662, 663 (2d Cir. 1969); Glenn v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 31, 34 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
"
9 Cressman v. United Airlines, 158 F. Supp. 404, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
00 Wright v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 263 F. Supp. 865, 869 (D.S.C.
1967). See Rodgers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), where the court stated:
The benefits and advantages to all parties in having the related ac-
tions considered in one jurisdiction under one judge are obvious.
Pre-trial proceedings can be conducted more efficiently, duplica-
tion of time and effort can be avoided and the benefit to witnesses
and to the parties calling them and having them attend only once
at one location is plain. Furthermore, to require defendants to re-
litigate the issue of liability in a number of forums would be vex-
atious and would not serve the ends of justice. The transfer of this
case to the District Court sitting in Chicago is in the interest of
sound judicial administration as well as speedier and more efficient
disposition of the mass of litigation arising out of this accident.
The phrase in S 1404(a) "in the interest of justice" requires that
"[bloth the interest of the parties to the lawsuit as well as society
in general should be considered."
202 F. Supp. at 313.
2*01 Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 746, 749-51
(E.D.N.Y. 1966); Schmidt v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 813,
816-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Popkin v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 244, 248-
51 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
202Popkin v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 244, 248-49 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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proposed transferee forum;..3 (3) practical solutions to the multi-
farious problems of duplication and inconvenience during pre-trial
procedure exist; 4 (4) consolidation with the actions pending in the
proposed transferee forum may be impossible due to juror confu-
sion resulting from the application of differing state substantive laws
of liability at trial, as required by Van Dusen;2°. (5) the issue of
damages requires separate trials; 0 (6) the benefits of consolidation
may be achieved without transfer since a verdict unfavorable to de-
fendant in the transferee forum may be determinative of the liabil-
ity issues in the transferor forum under collateral estoppel princi-
ples." Other considerations which may bear on the interest of jus-
tice and which may influence transfer include the inability to im-
plead third parties in the forum selected by the plaintiff,"' the ap-
plication of foreign law in the forum selected by the plaintiff,2 and
the congestion of the docket in the forum selected by the plaintiff."0
4. Pitfalls, Traps and Other Opportunities
In making a 1404(a) transfer motion it is incumbent upon the
defendant to remember that its burden of persuasion must be met
203 Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 746, 749-50
(E.D.N.Y. 1966); Schmidt v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 813,
816 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).204Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 746, 750 (E.
D.N.Y. 1966); Schmidt v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 813, 816
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
m Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). See Scaramuzzo v. American
Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 746, 750 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); Popkin v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 244, 249 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
1 Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 746, 751 (E.
D.N.Y. 1966).
"o Id. at 750-51; Schmidt v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 813,
816 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). It should be noted that the cases cited in notes 197-203
were decided prior to the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976) which provides
for pretrial consolidation of multi-district litigation.
I0 Popkin v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 244, 248, 251 (E.D. Pa.
1966); Watson v. Eastern Airlines, 5 Av. Cas. 17,996 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). But see
Bolles v. Allegheny Airlines, 5 Av. Cas. 17,909 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
200 Wright v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 263 F. Supp. 865, 867-68 (D.
S.C. 1967); Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 746, 750
(E.D.N.Y. 1966); Popkin v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 244, 250 (E.D.
Pa. 1966). But see Heiser v. United Airlines, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 237, 238 (S.D.
N.Y. 1958).
210 Scaramuzzo v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 260 F. Supp. 746, 751 (E.D.
N.Y. 1966); Glenn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 31, 35 (E.D.N.Y.
1962).
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with precision and specificity. Once again, a laundry list of witness-
es and their addresses will prove insufficient. The defendant should
identify the critical issues, witnesses and the nature of the testimony
reasonably anticipated from such witnesses. Damages should be
down-played, especially when the plaintiff is a resident of the forum
and argues that many of the witnesses regarding damages reside
locally. The court must be persuaded that this is not a "wink" mo-
tion, where aggressive oral argument is accompanied by the crossed
fingers of an attorney who does not wish to "lose" the case to an-
other law firm. Sometimes this reluctance can and should be ad-
dressed explicitly, especially where courts mention their own re-
luctance to give up "interesting" cases.
One final danger which should be mentioned is that of making a
1404 (a) motion prior to making a forum non conveniens dismissal
motion. In Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co.,11 arising out of the crash
of a Piper aircraft in Scotland, a wrongful death action was filed
in the California state court.1 The plaintiff was a California resi-
dent and the personal representative of the estates of various Scot-
tish decedents.13 The defendants, after removing the case to federal
court, successfully moved to transfer the litigation to the Middle
District of Pennsylvania under 1404(a)."" After the litigation had
been transferred to the federal court in Pennsylvania, defendants
then moved to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. Their
motion was granted by the court.'
Plaintiff argued on appeal that the district court erred in not con-
sidering whether the defendants were equitably estopped from mov-
ing to dismiss."" The court gave serious consideration to this argu-
ment and concluded:
Although a party who moves for transfer under Section 1404(a)
will not be automatically estopped to assert forum non conveniens
after a transfer is accomplished, the fact that a party previously
succeeded in a statutory transfer ought to be weighed against dis-






21 Id. at 150.
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missing for forum non conveniens and as adding to a defendant's
already substantial burden on a later motion. 1'
In order to overcome this added burden, the defendant may plead
that new facts bearing on the motion to dismiss on forum non con-
veniens grounds were discovered after the 1404(a) motion was
made in the transferor court. A showing that defendant's fuller
knowledge of the relevant facts has been acquired as a result of
more thorough research, however, is not likely to be received sym-
pathetically by the court."' The defendant possibly can avoid this
danger by specifically reserving the right to make a forum non con-
veniens dismissal motion after the litigation has been transferred
under section 1404(a). To accomplish this, the defendant should
clearly represent to the court hearing the 1404(a) motion that the
other United States forum is the most convenient place to try the
case only if it is to be tried in this country.
A better approach may be to make a section 1404(a) motion in
the alternative with a forum non conveniens dismissal motion. In
Macedo v. The Boeing Co.,"' wrongful death actions arising out
of the crash of a Portuguese airliner in Portugal were brought
against the foreign airline and the manufacturers, including Boe-
ing, in the federal district court in Illinois." '° The defendants moved
for dismissal of the litigation under the doctrine of forum non con-
217 Id. at 151. The Reyno court cited Insurance Co. of North America v.
Ozean-Stinnes-Linien, 367 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1966) where an insurance com-
pany, as subrogee of a Swiss shipper, brought an action in admiralty for damages
to cargo in shipment against a German association. The action was originally
commenced in the Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans. The litigation was
subsequently transferred under section 1404(a) to the Southern District of Geor-
gia, Savannah Division. After transfer, the federal court in Georgia granted de-
fendant's motion to decline jurisdiction on forum non conveniens grounds. On ap-
peal, the court held that defendant should not be permitted, after securing a sec-
tion 1404(a) transfer from Louisiana to Georgia, to contend that Georgia was
not really an appropriate forum. The court concluded that defendant may not
"so trifle with the judicial process." 367 F.2d at 227. Language in the court opin-
ion, however, implied that defendant may reserve the right to file a motion to
dismiss. In order to do so, a defendant apparently must assert in the section
1404(a) motion that the suggested transferee forum within the United States is
the most convenient place to try the case only if it is to be tried in this country. Id.
Cf. Grodinsky v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1245, 1248 (D. Md. 1981)
(defendant, having moved for dismissal in the original forum, preserved his right
to file a motion to dismiss in the transferee forum).
218 630 F.2d at 150-51.
219 15 Av. Cas. 18,032 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
2
2DId.
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veniens or, in the alternative, for transfer of the litigation under
1404(a). Although the Pacific Northwest was the principal place
of business of several defendants, the court stated that "Seattle,
Washington [was] not a significantly more convenient forum""' 1 and
therefore granted defendants' motion to dismiss. Thus, the mere
existence of an alternative federal forum will be insufficient to pre-
clude a dismissal on forum non-conveniens grounds, when defen-
dant makes a 1404(a) transfer motion in the alternative with a
dismissal motion.
C. Coordination and Consolidation of Pre-Trial
Proceedings-Section 1407
1. History
Due to congestion in the federal court system caused by multi-
ple anti-trust suits brought against the electric equipment industry,
and the limitations of section 1404(a) to consolidate efficiently
such litigation, Congress, in 1968, enacted Section 1407 of the
Judicial Code. ' This statute established the Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict Litigation and the procedures for coordinated or consoli-
dated pre-trial proceedings in multidistrict litigation. Section
1407 (a) provides:
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of
fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be trans-
ferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pre-trial pro-
ceedings. Such transfer shall be made by the Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination
that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of
parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient con-
duct of such actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded
by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pre-trial proceed-
ings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have
been previously terminated .... "'
Although the statute was not specifically designed for aviation dis-
aster litigation, it has been liberally resorted to by the Panel and
litigants in arcrash cases.
2Id. at 18,035 (emphasis added).
2228 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976).
328 U.S.C. S 1407(a) (1976).
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2. Applicable Factors
Transfer for coordinated or consolidated pre-trial proceedings
is permitted under section 1407 when (1) there exists one or more
common questions of fact; (2) transfer would be for the conven-
ience of the parties and witnesses; and (3) transfer would promote
the just and efficient conduct of the actions. ' Although "each
[§ 1407] application must be considered upon its merits and in re-
lation to particular problems in the various pending suits which
are the subject of the motion for consolidation or coordinated pre-
trial proceedings,"'  the question of whether the pending actions
should be transferred is rarely disputed in multi-district aviation
disaster litigation.' The Panel has concluded summarily that air
2' Id. One commentator has stated that the grounds sufficient for transfer under
section 1407 differ markedly from those under section 1404(a). The primary
purpose of 1407 is judicial efficiency and weight will be given to those factors
which bear directly on the smooth administration of the pre-trial proceedings.
Although the convenience of the parties and witnesses is a factor under 1407, it
should not be a controlling factor. And in contrast to 1404(a), the Panel need
not give any weight to the plaintiff's initial venue selection. See Comment, The
Search For The Most Convenient Federal Forum: Three Solutions To The Prob-
lems Of Multi-District Litigation, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 188, 195-96 (1969) [herein-
after referred to as The Search For the Most Convenient Federal Forum].
In In Re Concrete Pipe, 302 F. Supp. 244 (J.P.M.D.L. 1969), an anti-trust ac-
tion, Judge Weigel, in a concurring opinion, articulated some of the factors to be
considered in determining whether transfer would be appropriate:
How many questions of fact are there? What is their nature? How
many cases are presently and prospectively involved? What is the
geographical location of the districts in which the cases pend? If it
is anticipated that further cases will be filed, in what districts? Who
are the principal witnesses in the cases and where do they reside?
What detriment, financial or otherwise, will be imposed on any of
the parties by ordering transfer? Will transfer result in a substantial
saving of duplicative work? Will transfer usefully avoid conflicting
rulings in the pretrial proceedings of the cases involved? Can many
of the advantages of transfer be worked out by cooperation among
counsel without transfer? Are pretrial proceedings already far along
in any one or more of the cases? Will transfer hasten or delay pro-
gress in the cases? What is the availability of a judge or judges in
the proposed transferee court or courts? Will the advantages of
transfer overcome the normal desirability of having the same judge
who conducts the trial also conduct pretrial proceedings?
302 F. Supp. at 255-56 (Weigel, J., concurring).
225 In Re Air Crash Disaster at Falls City, Nebraska on August 6, 1966, 298
F. Supp. 1323, 1324 (J.P.M.D.L. 1969).
12 In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Saigon, South Vietnam, on April 4, 1975,
404 F. Supp. 478, 479 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975); In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Upper-
ville, Virginia, on December 1, 1974, 393 F. Supp. 1089 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975). In
In Re Air Crash Disaster in the Ionian Sea on September 8, 1974, 407 F. Supp. 238
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disaster litigation clearly meets all three requirements for section
1407 applicability." One commentator has even noted that the
Panel "will presume that it should order a transfer in disaster liti-
gation. '22
8
Despite the Panel's tendencies to transfer aviation disaster liti-
gation under section 1407 for coordinated or consolidated pre-trial
proceedings, transfer has been denied under certain circumstances.
The Panel has denied transfer of aviation disaster litigation when
the following conditions existed: (1) substantial venue and service
questions remain unresolved;" (2) extensive pre-trial discovery
had been completed;' (3) many plaintiffs had settled their
claims;"'" (4) only a few actions were pending;"2 (5) the pending
(J.P.M.D.L. 1974), the Panel noted that "the existence of common questions of
fact among these actions, as is usually the case in multi-district air disaster liti-
gation, is readily apparent." 407 F. Supp. at 239.
227 In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Saigon, South Vietnam, on April 4, 1975,
404 F. Supp. 478, 479 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975).
228 Comment, Consolidation and Transfer in the Federal Courts: 28 U.S.C.
Section 1407 Viewed In Light of Rule 42(a) and 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a), 22
HASTINGS L.J. 1289, 1311-12 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Consolidation and
Transfer].
'2' In Re Air Crash Disaster at Falls City, Nebraska on August 6, 1966, 298
F. Supp. 1323, 1324 (J.P.M.D.L. 1969). The Panel there stated that "[s]uch unde-
termined issues will not be resolved by a transfer under Section 1407, whereas
transfers to the Southern District of New York under Section 1406, if warranted,
will resolve the venue and service problems now existing in some of those cases."
Id. at 1324.
230 d. But see In re Air Crash Disaster Near Pellston, Michigan, on May 9,
1970, 357 F. Supp. 1286, 1287 (J.P.M.D.L. 1973).
231 In Re Air Crash Disaster at Falls City, Nebraska on August 6, 1966, 298
F. Supp. 1323, 1324 (J.P.M.D.L. 1969).
12 In Re Air Crash Disaster at Anchorage, Alaska on November 27, 1970, 342
F. Supp. 755, 756 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972). In In re Anchorage, three actions arising out
of the crash of a military charter flight operated by Capitol International Air-
ways, wherein forty-seven persons suffered fatal injuries, eighteen persons suffered
serious injuries and thirty-four persons suffered minor injuries, were pending in
three different districts. The Panel stated, "We think it premature to decide the
question of transfer and to choose a transferee district until more actions have
been filed." Id. at 756. But see In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Saigon, South Viet-
nam, on April 4, 1975, 404 F. Supp. 478 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975), where five actions
were pending in five different districts arising out of the crash of a Lockheed C-5A
aircraft in which over 155 persons suffered fatal injuries. The Panel rejected plain-
tiff's claim that transfer under Section 1407 would be premature and stated:
Although additional actions will likely be filed in this litigation,
there has been sufficient development so that an informed decision
on the propriety of transfer and the appropriate transferee court
can be made. And, we note, there are well established procedures
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actions raised substantially different questions of fact;" or (6) the
possibility of duplicative discovery could be easily avoided through
cooperative efforts among the parties,.' The Panel has also vacated
conditional transfer orders of tag-alonge' cases where liability is ad-
mitted by the defendant' and where pre-trial proceedings in the
transferee forum concerning the common issue of liability have
been concluded."" The requirement of commonality of factual is-
sues will not be deemed to have been subverted by the presence of
differing legal theories with regard to the liability of the aircraft
manufacturer, the airline and the individual airline employees."'
The Panel has concluded that consolidation of actions brought by
survivors of the crew of the aircraft and actions brought by surviv-
ors of passengers onboard the aircraft, where differing legal the-
by which 'tag-along' actions can be quickly considered for transfer
under Section 1407.
Id. at 479 n.l.
"' In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Natchitoches Parish, Louisiana, on Sep-
tember 20, 1973, 391 F. Supp. 765 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975). In In Re Natchitoches
three actions arising out of the crash of an aircraft into a tree on take off were
pending in two districts. Two of the actions were instituted against the owner and
operator of the crash aircraft under a theory of negligent operation. The other
remaining action was instituted against the owner and maintainer of the airport
under a theory of negligence due to his failure to cut down, mark or advise
pilots of the trees near the end of the runway. The Panel found that the actions
raised substantially different questions of fact and therefore transfer was not
justified. Id. at 766-67.
11 Id. But see In Re Aircrash Near Van Cleve, Mississippi, on August 13,
1977, 15 Av. Cas. 18,072 (J.P.M.D.L. 1980), where the Panel rejected defen-
dant's argument that voluntary cooperation among the parties in courts involved
in the litigation was a viable and preferable alternative to a Section 1407 trans-
fer. The Panel stated, "While voluntary coordination of pretrial efforts is always
commendable, transfer of these actions to a single district under Section 1407 will
ensure the streamlining of discovery and all other pretrial proceedings." Id. at
18,073.
Rule 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multi-District
Litigation defines "tag-along" action as a civil action involving common ques-
tions of fact with actions previously transferred under Section 1407.
'" In Re Air Crash Disaster at Pago Pago, American Samoa, on January 30,
1974, 394 F. Supp. 799 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975).
2I In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Upperville, Virginia on December 1, 1974,
430 F. Supp. 1295 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977).
"8 In re Air Crash at Schenley Golf Course, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on
August 21, 1977, 510 F. Supp. 1228 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979); In Re Air Crash Disaster
in the Ionian Sea on September 8, 1974, 407 F. Supp. 238, 239-40 (J.P.M.D.L.
1974); In Re Air Crash Disaster at Paris, France, on March 3, 1974, 386 F.
Supp. 1404, 1405 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975).
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ories were pursued, would not be prejudicial and therefore has re-
fused to sever such actions. '
3. Selecting the Transferee Forum
In contrast to section 1404(a), actions subject to section 1407's
procedures may be transferred to any district regardless of where
they "might have been brought.""' Thus, actions may be trans-
ferred under section 1407 to any district even though venue and
jurisdiction would not exist in the transferee district."1 Although
section 1407 offers no guidelines in selecting the transferee forum,
the Panel has developed criteria for selecting the transferee district
in aviation disaster litigation. These criteria distinguish between ac-
cidents that occur within the United States and accidents that occur
outside of the United States.'
a. Domestic Accidents
For aviation accidents occurring within the United States, the
Panel has frequently chosen the forum where the accident oc-
curred.' The Panel's proclivity to transfer to the situs of the crash
'In Re Air Crash Disaster at the Greater Cincinnati Airport on November
8, 1965, 295 F. Supp. 51 (J.P.M.D.L. 1968). See In Re Air Crash Disaster at
Paris, France, on March 3, 1974, 386 F. Supp. 1404, 1405 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975),
where the Panel noted that "Plaintiffs' [representing deceased crew members]
fear of conflict in the transferee district between themselves and plaintiffs rep-
resenting deceased passengers is unwarranted. The transferee judge has consid-
erable flexibility in supervising the pretrial proceedings to insure that any conflict-
ing interests among the various plaintiffs are accomodated." 386 F. Supp. at
1405.
240 The Search for the Most Convenient Federal Forum, supra, note 224, at
193; Kaminsky, The Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation: Emerging Prob-
lems and Current Trends of Decisions, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 817, 819 (1972);
McLachlan, The Multi-District Litigation Act: The Demise of Venue, 49 Ci. B.
REc. 367, 372 (1968).
21 In re Air Crash at Schenley Golf Course, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on
August 21, 1977, 510 F. Supp. 1228, 1231 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979).
242 The commentators have proffered a number of practical considerations for
selection of the transferee forum in aviation disaster litigation. See Farrell, Multi-
District Litigation in Aviation Accident Cases, 38 J. Am L. & COM. 159, 163
1972); Atkins, An Apologia for Transfer of Aviation Disaster Cases Under Sec-
tion 1407, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 205, 210-11 (1972).
1 In Re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy International Airport on
June 24, 1975, 407 F. Supp. 244, 246 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976); In Re Air Crash Dis-
aster Near Upperville, Virginia, on December 1, 1974, 393 F. Supp. 1089, 1090
(J.P.M.D.L. 1975); In Re Delta Airlines Crash at Boston, Massachusetts, on July
31, 1973, 373 F. Supp. 1406 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974); In Re Air Crash Disaster Near
Coolidge, Arizona, on May 6, 1971, 362 F. Supp. 572 (J.P.M.D.L. 1973); In
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"is grounded on the belief that discovery proceedings on the com-
mon issue of liability can ordinarily be most effectively and expedi-
tiously supervised in that district."' The Panel has deviated from
the "situs of the crash" rule on occasion, utilizing a number of
different criteria. to select the transferee forum. In some instances
the Panel has applied the same policy considerations that under-
lie the "situs of the crash" rule and has selected the forum where
the majority of documents and witnesses relative to the liability is-
sues were located. For example, in In Re Air Crash Disaster
Near Atlantic City, New Jersey' and In Re Air Crash Disaster at
Las Vegas, Nevada' the Panel transferred multi-district actions to
districts where the documents and witnesses concerning the design
and manufacture of the aircraft were located."' In In Re Air Crash
Near Van Cleve, Mississippi' discovery and other pre-trial pro-
ceedings concerning the liability issues would in all likelihood fo-
cus on at least six different geographic areas. The Panel therefore
Re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades on December 29, 1972, 360 F. Supp.
1394 (J.P.M.D.L. 1973); In Re Air Crash Disaster at Huntington, West Virginia
on November 14, 1970, 342 F. Supp. 1400, 1402-03 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972); In Re
Mid-Air Collision Near Fairland, Indiana on September 9, 1969, 309 F. Supp
621, 622-23 (J.P.M.D.L. 1970).
2" In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Upperville, Virginia, on December 1, 1974,
393 F. Supp. 1089, 1090 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975). In In Re Air Crash Disaster at John
F. Kennedy International Airport on June 24, 1975, 407 F. Supp. 244 (J.P.M.D.L.
1976), the Panel was not persuaded to deviate from its "situs of the crash" rule
and stated:
Most of the anticipated key witnesses on the issue of liability re-
side near Kennedy Airport, for example: the FAA air traffic con-
trollers from the New York Common IFR Room and the New
York Air Route Traffic Control Center, local weather observers and
forecasters, Port of New York Authority officials responsible for
supervising the airport's operation, and approximately forty eye
witnesses. Moreover, the tape recordings of conversations between
the traffic controllers and the flight-crew, as well as other relevant
documents from the FAA and the National Weather Service are lo-
cated in the Eastern District of New York.
Id. at 246.
215 352 F. Supp. 969 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972).
24 336 F. Supp. 414 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972). The Panel noted that the only com-
mon questions of fact involved the liability issues and that discovery with regard
to these issues would be focused in the district where the allegedly defective
component was designed and installed. Id. at 415.
247 In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Atlantic City, New Jersey, on July 26, 1969,
352 F. Supp. 969, 971 (J.P.M.D.L. 1973); In Re Air Crash Disaster at Las Vegas,
Nevada on October 8, 1968, 336 F. Supp. 414, 415 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972).
241 15 Av. Cas. 18,072 (J.P.M.D.L. 1980).
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transferred the actions to the more centrally located and easily ac-
cessible forum in order to further the most expeditious resolution
of the actions."
In some instances the Panel has inexplicably varied from the
policy considerations that underlie the "situs of the crash" rule and
has applied other criteria. These include: (1) where the majority
of other actions were pending;' (2) where discovery was ad-
vanced and where the transferee judge was familiar with the
issues raised in the litigation;" and (3) where there existed an
opportunity to coordinate discovery with pending state court ac-
tions."5' When actions have been transferred under section 1404 (a)
prior to the Panel's transfer determination, the district selected
under 1404(a) considerations will be given deference by the Panel
in making its determination.'
b. Foreign Accidents
Different approaches have been developed by the Panel for
foreign accidents, since the Panel may not transfer actions to the
situs of the crash when the accident has occurred outside of the
United States." No general rule, however, has yet emerged with
respect to the Panel's selection of a transferee forum in litigation
involving overseas air disasters.' The recent trend of the Panel
49Id. at 18,073-74.
1o See In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Uppervile, Virginia, on December 1,
1974, 393 F. Supp. 1089, 1090 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975); In Re Mid-Air Collision near
Fairland, Indiana on September 9, 1969, 309 F. Supp. 621, 622 (J.P.M.D.L.
1970).
21 In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Pellston, Michigan, on May 9, 1970, 357
F. Supp. 1286, 1287 (J.P.M.D.L. 1973); In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Atlantic
City, New Jersey, on July 26, 1969, 352 F. Supp. 969-71 (J.P.M.D.L. 1973).
212 In Re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades on December 29, 1972, 360
F. Supp. 1394, 1395-96 (J.P.M.D.L. 1973); In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Silver
Plume, Colorado, on October 2, 1970, 352 F. Supp. 968, 969 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972).
253 In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, New Hampshire, on October 25,
1968, 314 F. Supp. 62, 63 (J.P.M.D.L. 1970).
24 The Panel has noted that "the mere proximity of the East Coast to the
situs of the crash, however, is not in and of itself a persuasive reason to support
transfer of all actions to an East Coast forum." In Re Air Crash Disaster at Paris,
France, on March 3, 1974, 376 F. Supp. 887, 888 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974).
215 See In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Santa Cruz Airport, Bombay, India on
January 1, 1978, 463 F. Supp. 158, 159 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979); In Re Air Crash Dis-
aster at Taipei International Airport on July 31, 1975, 433 F. Supp. 1120, 1121
(J.P.M.D.L. 1977); In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Saigon, South Vietnam, on
April 4, 1975, 404 F. Supp. 478, 479 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975).
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has been to follow the policy behind the "situs of the crash" rule
and transfer actions to the forum that appears to have the greater
nexus to the liability phase of the litigation.' In In Re Air Crash
Disaster Near Bombay, India,"" an Air India 747 jumbo jet
crashed shortly after take-off from the Santa Cruz airport, Bombay,
India, killing all 213 persons onboard. Shortly thereafter, sixty-
three actions were instituted in the Central District of California
and two actions were instituted in the district court of the District of
Columbia against the Boeing Company, the manufacturer of the
aircraft, and Lear Siegler, Inc., the manufacturer of component
parts of the aircraft. Although most of the actions were pending in
the Central District of California and the judge who assigned those
actions had considerable prior experience with air disaster litiga-
tion, the Panel found that the Western District of Washington, the
district in which the aircraft had been manufactured, "ha[d] the
most substantial connection to the common factual questions
raised in [the] litigation.""8 Despite the Panel's noted reluctance
01 In Re Air Crash Disaster at Tenerife, Canary Islands on March 27, 1977,
435 F. Supp. 927, 929 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977); See In Re Air Crash Disaster Near
Santa Cruz Airport, Bombay, India on January 1, 1978, 463 F. Supp. 158, 159 (J.
P.M.D.L. 1979); In Re Air Crash Disaster at Taipei International Airport on July
31, 1975, 433 F. Supp. 1120, 1122 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977); In Re Air Crash Disaster at
Paris, France, on March 3, 1974, 376 F. Supp. 887, 888 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974). In In
Re Tenerife, the Panel concluded that a New York forum would have a greater
nexus than a California forum and stated:
The surviving pilot and the first officer of the Pan Am aircraft re-
side in the New York area and are key witnesses. Also important
are investigators of the collision from the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration and the National Transportation Safety Board, who ap-
parently reside in either the New York area or the Washington,
D.C. area. In addition, Pan Am's headquarters are located in New
York and, as certain defendants and plaintiff represent, many of the
relevant documents and witnesses will be found in the New York
vicinity.
435 F. Supp. at 929.
11463 F. Supp. 158 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979).
28 ld. at 159. The Panel premised their finding on the following:
Boeing is headquartered in that district and the aircraft involved in
this crash was manufactured there. As a result, Boeing's documents
and personnel relating to the design, manufacture and testing of
the aircraft are located there. Moreover, the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration's Regional Office that has custody of the records re-
lating to certification of the aircraft is located there, and Boeing
employees who participated in the on-site investigation of the acci-
dent can be found there.
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to transfer actions to a district in which no related action was
pending, " the Panel in In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Bombay,
India concluded that appropriate circumstances existed warranting
such a transfer and for the first time transferred aviation disaster
litigation to a district where no actions were pending.' The Panel
concluded that, not only did the Western District of Washington
have the most substantial connection to the common factual ques-
tions, but none of the other districts in which the actions were pend-
ing offered a strong nexus to such questions."'
In earlier cases the Panel applied other criteria in determining
the transferee forum. The Panel, in such cases, had focused on the
following criteria: (1) where the majority of other actions were
2 See In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Saigon, South Vietnam, on April 4,
1975, 404 F. Supp. 478, 479-80 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975); In Re Air Crash Disaster Near
Papeete, Tahiti on July 22, 1973, 397 F. Supp. 886, 887 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975); But
see In Re Sundstrand Data Control, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 1019 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978).
In In Re Sundstrand five actions concerning the validity of certain Sundstrand
patents were brought in four federal districts, two in Oklahoma and one each in
Florida, Illinois and Iowa. All parties agreed that the five actions should be con-
solidated pursuant to Section 1407 and, except for Sundstrand, argued for trans-
fer to the Western District of Washington, where Sundstrand had its principal
place of business. The Panel transferred the actions to the Western District of
Washington, where no related actions were pending, and stated:
None of the districts in which actions are pending offers a strong
nexus to the common factual questions in this litigation and little
discovery on those issues could be expected to occur in any of them.
Nor, by counsel for SDC's admission at the hearing of this matter
could pre-trial proceedings be characterized as significantly further
advanced in any one particular district .... The Western District of
Washington, however, has a substantial connection to the common
factual questions raised in the litigation. SDC's principal place of
business is located in that District and it is undisputed that many
of the ground proximity warning systems chief inventors reside
there. Additionally, it appears that records relating to flight tests
of SDC's ground proximity warning system are located at the FAA's
Regional Office in Seattle. All parties also agree that discovery re-
garding the development of the ground proximity warning system
will be taken from the Boeing Company, an aircraft concern which
is headquartered in the Western District of Washington as well as
from SDC. Thus, we are persuaded that most of the relevant docu-
ments and witnesses on the central issue of the validity of SDC's
patents are located in the vicinity of that District. Moreover, several
parties represent that significant discovery on anti-trust issues in-
volved in this litigation will also focus on the SDC documents
found in the Seattle area.
433 F. Supp. at 1021.
260 In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Santa Cruz Airport, Bombay, India on Jan-
uary 1, 1978, 463 F. Supp. 158, 159 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979).
211 Id. at 159.
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pending; "2 (2) where discovery and pre-trial proceedings were
advanced;2' (3) where there existed an opportunity to coordinate
discovery with pending state court actions;0" (4) where the docket
of the court was less congested; (5) where the convenience of
the transferee judge would best be served;"" and (6) where the
transferee judge was experienced with air disaster litigation or was
familiar with the issues.07
4. Remand at Conclusion of the Pre-Trial Proceedings
Section 1407 explicitly provides that, at or before the conclusion
of the pre-trial proceedings, each action transferred under the sta-
tute shall be remanded by the Panel to the district from which it
was transferred." 8 Despite this clear statutory mandate, the opera-
tional effect has been the absence of remand upon the completion
of pre-trial proceedings. Thus, although the Panel's initial transfer
determination under section 1407 is not affected by the possibility
of a subsequent section 1404(a) transfer for the purposes of trial
by the transferee judge,' section 1407 effectively determines the
district in which the litigation will be tried.
The reasons actions have not been remanded by the Panel after
a section 1407 transfer are generally twofold. First, upon comple-
202 In Re Air Crash Disaster in the Ionian Sea on September 8, 1974, 407 F.
Supp. 238, 240 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974) (the Panel's decision was also colored by the
fact that some discovery had already advanced and that a substantial amount of
additional discovery would occur in the transferee district); In Re Air Crash Dis-
aster Near Saigon, South Vietnam, on April 4, 1975, 404 F. Supp. 478, 480 (J.P.
M.D.L. 1975) (the Panel's decision was again influenced by the fact that dis-
covery would be sought in the transferee forum); In Re Air Crash Disaster at
Bali, Indonesia, on April 22, 1974, 400 F. Supp. 1402, 1403 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975).
w In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Santa Cruz Airport, Bombay, India on
January 1, 1978, 463 F. Supp. 158, 159 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979); In Re Air Crash Dis-
aster in the Ionian Sea on September 8, 1974, 407 F. Supp. 238, 240 (J.P.M.D.
L. 1974).
'2 In Re Air Crash Disaster at Tenerife, Canary Islands on March 27, 1977,
435 F. Supp. 927, 929 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977).
In Re Air Crash Disaster at Taipei International Airport on July 31, 1975,
433 F. Supp. 1120, 1122 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977).
1 In Re Air Crash Disaster at Pago Pago, American Samoa, on January 30,
1974, 383 F. Supp. 501, 502 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974).
21 In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Papeete, Tahiti, on July 22, 1973, 397 F.
Supp. 886, 887 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975).
-828 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976).
"' In Re Air Crash Disaster at Toronto International Airport on July 5, 1970,
346 F. Supp. 533, 534 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972).
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tion of discovery and pre-trial proceedings in the transferee forum,
a trial on the merits may no longer be necessary because the de-
fendants have either admitted liability or agreed not to contest lia-
bility pursuant to a contribution formula. Second, the transferee
judge may determine the substantive liability or damages issue by
the use of the following procedures: (1) motion for summary judg-
ment or partial summary judgment;" ' (2) transfer of all the 1407
consolidated cases to himself under section 1404(a) for purposes
of trial; 1 (3) consolidated trial of the liability issues pursuant to
the parties' consent;" " or (4) trial of a test case originally brought
in the transferee court.
Although the commentators have questioned critically the prac-
tice of the transferee courts which transfer actions previously
assigned under section 1407 to themselves under section 1404(a)
270 Reidinger v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 463 F.2d 1017, 1018 n.2 (6th Cir.
(1972). With regard to the power of the transferee court under Section 1407 to
grant summary judgment the court in Reidinger stated: "The legislative history in-
dicates that the power to conduct civil pre-trial proceedings includes the power to
consider motions for summary judgment: under the Federal rules the transferee
district could have authority to render summary judgment ... 1968 U.S. Code
Congressional and Administrative News, p. 1900." Id.
Rule 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litiga-
tion provides: "In the absence of unusual circumstances-(a) Actions terminated
in the transferee court by valid judgment, including but not limited to summary
judgment .... shall not be remanded by the Panel and shall be dismissed by the
transferee court." 28 U.S.C. S 1407 (1976).
271 Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1971); In Re Air Crash
Disaster at John F. Kennedy International Airport on June 24, 1975, 479 F. Supp.
1118 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Duarte, California, on
June 6, 1971, 357 F. Supp. 1013 (C.D. Cal. 1973); In Re Antibiotic Antitrust
Actions, 333 F. Supp. 299, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); In Re Air Crash Disaster Near
Hanover, New Hampshire, on October 25, 1968, 314 F. Supp. 62, 63 n.1 (J.P.M.
D.L. 1970); In Re Mid-Air Collision Near Fairland, Indiana on September 9,
1969, 309 F. Supp. 621, 623 n.6 (J.P.M.D.L. 1970); In Re Mid-Air Collision
Near Hendersonville, North Carolina on July 19, 1967, 297 F. Supp. 1039, 1040
(J.P.M.D.L. 1969).
Rule 11 (b), of the Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Lit-
igation provides:
Each transferred action that has not been terminated in the trans-
feree court shall be remanded by the Panel to the transferor district
for trial, unless ordered transferred by the transferee judge to the
transferee or other district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C.
S 1406. In the event that the transferee judge transfers an action
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) or 1406, no further action of the Panel
shall be necessary to authorize further proceedings including trial.
28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (1976).
272 Butterfield v. Oculus Contact Lens Co., 332 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. IMl. 1971).
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for purposes of trial, " the power of the transferee courts to ac-
complish this result is well settled.' In In Re Air Crash Near
Duarte, California"5 the court ordered sua sponte that the actions
assigned for purposes of consolidated pre-trial proceedings be trans-
ferred to itself for purposes of trial on all issues under section
1404(a).'" The court reasoned that:
There is only one operative set of facts for the determination of
liability. To remand the cases to the various courts for trial after
the completion of discovery would require trials on the merits in
three different districts. No matter how much some counsel may
puff their own claims of ability to secure swift judgment on liability
in such cases and demean all other counsel's ability, the raw, hard,
and inescapable fact is that such trials, at best, require extensive
and intensive preparation and skill and are usually prolonged, and
may produce different results in different districts. Such a result in
this case is certainly not "in the interest of justice" nor "for the
convenience of witnesses."2"
The transferee court's use of section 1404(a), however, is sub-
ject to the limitation embodied in the statute: the transferee court
must be a district where the actions "might have been brought." "
The facts weighed by the transferee court in determining wheth-
er to transfer the assigned actions to itself for purposes of trial
under section 1404(a) tend to be different than those normally
employed by the transferor judge."79 The transferee judge, who is
primarily interested in efficient judicial administration, inevitably
considers his own convenience in making the transfer determina-
tion at the expense of the convenience of the parties."' Contrary
" Comment, The Experience of Transferee Courts Under the Multi-District
Litigation Act, 39 U. Cm. L. REV. 588 (1972); [hereinafter cited as The Experi-
ence of the Tranesferee Courts]; Farrell, Multidistrict Litigation in Aviation Acci-
dent Cases, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 159 (1972); Kalinowski, The Power of a Trans-
feree Judge to Transfer Liability and Damages Trial, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 197
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Kalinowski].
174 See note 271 supra.
"5 357 F. Supp. 1013 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
* Id. at 1016
277Id.
'8 See notes 153-57 supra and accompanying text.
179 Kalinowski, supra note 273, at 199-200; The Experience of the Transferee
Courts, supra note 273, at 607.
180 Kalinowski, supra note 273, at 199-200; The Experience of the Transferee
Courts, supra note 273, at 607.
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to the dictates of section 1404(a), "the important and controlling
factor [seems to be] whether the transferee judge who conducts the
pre-trial proceedings wants to try the cases.
28 1
A request that the Panel determine the propriety of remand at
the time the section 1407 transfer motion is heard has been held
to be fatally premature. 282 An early determination by the Panel
would infringe upon the transferee judge's discretion to make
orders he deems appropriate to effectuate the expeditious and har-
monious conduct of the litigation."' Likewise, a request for remand
after a section 1407 transfer is ordered may be premature when
notice of suggestion of remand from the transferee judge to the
Panel is absent. 8 ' When the movant has failed to meet the strong
burden of persuasion to show that remand is proper, the motion,
of course, will be denied."
A recent case to consider the power of a court to order the
remand of actions transferred under section 1407 is In re Air
Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy International Airport.8 In
Kennedy, numerous actions pending in four federal districts and
arising from the crash of an Eastern Airlines 727 jet were trans-
ferred under section 1407 to the Eastern District of New York for
consolidated and coordinated pre-trial proceedings." Thereafter,
the transferee court transferred the actions assigned under section
1407 to itself for trial of the liability issues pursuant to section
1404(a).288 The transfer for purposes of trial under 1404(a) was
effected without prejudice to the right of any plaintiffs to move,
subsequent to final judgment, for an order remanding their actions
to the district from which they originated for trial of the damages
issues. " After the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs and
against the defendant, Eastern Airlines, on the issue of liability,
281 Kalinowski, supra note 273, at 200.
212 In Re Air Crash Disaster in the Ionian Sea on September 8, 1974, 407 F.
Supp. 238, 240 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974).
283 Id.
284 In Re Air Crash Disaster in the Ionian Sea on September 8, 1974, 438 F.
Supp. 932, 934 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977).
285 Id.
8479 F. Supp. 1118 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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the plaintiffs moved the court under 1404(a) to remand their ac-
tions to the district from which they originated for trial of the dam-
ages issue. ' The court granted plaintiffs' motions to remand, con-
cluding that there existed no commonality of facts or considerations
of party or witness convenience that tied trial of the damages issues
to the federal forum in New York."' The following facts were sig-
nificant to the court's decision:
The business records of both the plaintiffs and the decedents are
located in Louisiana, most of their damage witnesses reside in
Louisiana, the defendant Eastern Airlines does business and has
been served with process in Louisiana, and the respective districts
represent the plaintiffs' choice of forum as their original actions
were filed there."'
5. Availability of Pre-Trial Coordination or
Consolidation in State Courts
Although universal acceptance of the federal pre-trial coordina-
tion and consolidation procedures has not been attained, some
states have adopted similar procedures. For example, provisions
were added to the California Code of Civil Procedure in 1972
authorizing the coordination of civil actions pending in different
courts which share common questions of fact or law."' These pro-
01d. at 1121.
2911d. at 1123.
292 Id. See also Dispenza v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 239
(E.D.N.Y. 1981).
293 CAL CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 404-404.8 (West 1973). Section 404 provides:
When civil actions sharing a common question of fact or law are
pending in different courts, the presiding or sole judge of any such
court, on his own motion or on the motion of any party supported
by an affidavit stating facts showing that the actions meet the stand-
ards specified in Section 404.1 or all the parties, plaintiff or defen-
dant, in any such action, supported by an affidavit supported by
facts showing that the actions meet the standards specified by sec-
tion 404.1 may request the Chairman of the Judicial Council to
assign a judge to determine whether coordination of the actions is
appropriate and a judge shall be so assigned to make that determ-
ination.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 404 (West 1973).
Section 404.7 provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Judicial
Council shall provide by rule the practice and procedure for coordination of civil
actions in convenient courts, including provisions for giving notice and presenting
evidence." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404.7 (West 1973).
The Rules for the Coordination of Civil Actions Commenced in Different Trial
Courts were adopted by the Judicial Council of the State of California, effective
January 1, 1974. CAL R. OF COURT 1501-1550.
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visions were based in part on the experience of the federal courts
in handling multi-district litigation under section 1407." ' Since
the coordination procedures were not operative until 1974 there
is scant legal precedent concerning the interpretation and applica-
tion of these procedures.
The standards to be considered in determining whether civil
actions sharing common questions of fact or law9 should be co-
ordinated are set forth in section 404.1 :,,"
Coordination of civil actions sharing a common question of fact
or law is appropriate if one judge hearing all of the actions for
all purposes in a selected site or sites will promote the ends of
justice taking into account whether the common question of fact
or law is predominating and significant to the litigation; the con-
venience of the parties, witnesses and counsel; the relative de-
velopment of the actions and the work product of counsel; the effi-
cient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower; the calendar of
the Court; the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rul-
ings, orders or judgment; and, the likelihood of settlement of the
actions without further litigation should coordination be denied."'1
However, the California Rules of Court provide that "the imme-
nence of trial in any action otherwise appropriate for coordination
may be a ground for summary denial of a petition" for coordi-
nation.9
The California coordination statute and rules have adopted sev-
eral provisions not found in the federal statutes and rules. For
example, a petition for coordination may be accompanied by an
application for an order staying all actions pending the coordi-
nation determination. 9' In addition, any party may file a peremp-
294 3 Witkin, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE 108, § 265A (2d ed. Supp. 1979).
295 One commentator has stated that "the drafters of 1407 intentionally avoided
providing for transfer of actions involving only common questions of law, in part,
to avoid the necessity of having the transferee court apply transferor state law
in the determination of local issues." The Search for the Most Convenient Federal
Forum, supra note 224, at 200. This problem, of course, does not arise when all
actions are originally filed in the courts of the same states.
29 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 404.1 (West 1973).
297 Id.
" CAL. RULES OF COURT 1521 (d).
29R CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 404.5; CAL. R. OF COURT 1514(a). The application
must establish that "a stay order is necessary and appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of coordination." CAL. R. OF COURT 1514(a). Unless otherwise speci-
fied in the stay order, all proceedings in the action to which it applies are sus-
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tory challenge of an assigned coordination trial judge within 20
days after service of the order assigning such judge.' After the
actions have been ordered coordinated, the assigned coordination
trial judge shall select a court he deems "appropriate" for trial of
the coordinated proceedings."' The discretion of the coordination
trial judge is to be guided by criteria outlined in the Judicial
Council Rules.' The relevant provision provides that the assigned
trial judge may:
schedule and conduct hearings, conferences and a trial or trials
at any site within the state he deems appropriate with due con-
sideration to the convenience of the parties, witnesses and counsel;
the relative development of the actions and the work product of
counsel; the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and man-
power; and the calendar of the courts . . ."
In a mass disaster aviation tort case, litigation arising from the
PSA mid-air collision in San Diego was transferred for coordinated
proceedings to the county in which the accident occurred.'
In contrast to section 1407, the California coordination statute
provides that coordination shall be for all purposes.' There are
provisions, however, which permit the trial judge to remand or
transfer" any coordinated action. If remand is opposed by any of
pended. CAL. R. OF COURT 1514(c). See generally Keenan v. Superior Court, 111
Cal. App. 3d 336 (1980). The pendency of coordination proceedings before the
Panel under Section 1407 does not affect or suspend orders in pre-trial proceed-
ings in district courts in which such actions are pending and does not limit the
pre-trial jurisdiction of the court. R. PROC. J.P.M.D.L. 16. See In Re Air Crash
Disaster at Paris, France, on March 3, 1974, 376 F. Supp. 887, 888 (J.P.M.D.L.
1974), wherein the Panel stated that the question of whether discovery proceed-
ings should be stayed pending the Panel's coordination determination was within
the sole discretion of the transferor judge.
300 CAL. R. OF COURT 1515.
0 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404.3 (West Supp. 1981) provides:
If the assigned judge determines that coordination is appropriate, he
shall order the actions coordinated, report that fact to the Chairman
of the Judicial Council, and the Chairman of the Judicial Council
shall assign a judge to hear and determine the action in the site or
sites the assigned judge finds appropriate.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404.3 (West Supp. 1981).
302 CAL. R. OF COURT 1541(b) (2).
303 Id.
3' Pesses v. Superior Court, 107 Cal. App. 3d 117 (1980).
30 CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 404.1 (West 1981).
N' CAL. R. OF COURT 1542.
307 CAL. R. OF COURT 1543.
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the parties the assigned trial judge shall consider the same factors
specified in section 404.1 to justify coordination.."8 If transfer is
opposed by any of the parties, the assigned trial judge shall consid-
er factors nearly identical to the factors specified in section 404.1 .'
In Pesses v. Superior Court,10 numerous wrongful death actions
arising out of the mid-air collision between a Pacific Southwest
Airline ("PSA") 727 aircraft and a Cessna aircraft were coordi-
nated for pre-trial and trial in San Diego, the county where the
accident occurred."' PSA stipulated to liability after the actions
had been ordered coordinated and transferred to San Diego."'
The plaintiffs, who originally had filed actions in Los Angeles,
then moved the coordinated trial judge to remand or transfer their
actions back to Los Angeles for pending trials of the damages
issues."'
The plaintiffs made a strong showing of witness inconvenience
and hardship14 and asserted that denial by the Los Angeles court
prior to coordination of PSA's motion to change venue to San
Diego had established suitability of venue in Los Angeles." ' Plain-
tiffs further pointed out that the original order coordinating the
actions had been made "without prejudice to the parties in any
action originally filed outside San Diego County to request a re-
transfer of such action to the originating county for trial on the
issue of damages.'... Although the court in Pesses intimated that
plaintiffs would be prejudiced if the burden rested on them to
;establish the grounds for transfer,1 ' and that the order coordinating
the actions shifted the burden to PSA to justify retention of the
actions in San Diego, 1 ' the court held that it was inappropriate
'o CAL. R. OF COURT 1542.
'09 CAL. R. OF COURT 1543. Criteria delineated in Section 404.1 that are omit-
ted from Rule 1543 include the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rul-
ings, orders or judgments and the likelihood of settlement of the actions.
310 107 Cal. App. 3d 117 (1980).
'" Id. at 119.
313 Id.
313 Id.
3 4 Id. at 120-22.
15 Id. at 119-20.
31I Id. at 120.
31 Id. at 124.
a Id. at 120.
19811
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
to remand or transfer the cases to Los Angeles for pending trials
of damages."' The court noted that the California venue cases
limited to the narrow perspective of witness convenience did not
determine the coordination question;.. rather, the question of re-
mand or transfer rested on broader considerations specified in the
coordination statutes and rules, including:
1. the presence of common questions of law;
2. the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower;
3. the calendar of the court;
4. the disadvantage of duplication and inconsistent rulings."
Since the assigned trial judge must weigh and balance these fac-
tors in order to determine whether coordination or severance serves
the ends of justice, a rule of automatic remand or transfer when
common questions of law or fact cease to exist was rejected. "
The court concluded that the assigned trial judge did not abuse
his discretion, since there was evidence in the record indicating that
the foregoing considerations would be served by retention of the
litigation in San Diego.'
6. Pitfalls, Traps and Other Opportunities
When actions are pending in only two districts the plaintiff may
attempt to oppose a section 1407 transfer by dismissing one of
319 Id.
320 Id. at 124.
31 Id. at 125. These factors are set forth in Section 404.1 and are incorporated
in both the remand and transfer rules.
,Id. at 126.
Id. The court stated:
There is some evidence in the record all of these factors will be
served by retaining the case in San Diego. Plaintiffs do not deny
the existence of common questions of law, particularly that of pre-
judgment interest, and the possible unfairness of inconsistent rulings
on that issue among the various heirs of victims of the same air-
crash. Likewise, it is clear the considerable time invested in coordi-
nating the cases in San Diego and conducting pre-trial preparation
would also be wasted if the cases must proceed anew in Los
Angeles. Likewise, the additional burden on the Court calendar in
Los Angeles, coupled with the necessary rescheduling here, may be
a burden on the calendar of either or both courts, and an imposi-
tion on the statewide judiciary as a whole in negating much of the
benefits so far realized from coordination.
Id. at 125. Compare Pesses with the Panel's remand determination under Sec-
tion 1407 in In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy International Airport
on June 24, 1975, 479 F. Supp. 1118 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). See notes 286-92 supra
and accompanying text.
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the actions so that actions are pending in only one district, thereby
rendering 1407 inapplicable. The defendant, however, can resist
the plaintiff's efforts to dismiss by asserting that dismissal would
affect a substantive legal right: the application of different law
to the litigation." If transfer of the litigation to another forum
under section 1407 is desired, consideration should be given to
making an application to the Panel at the earliest opportunity.
This may be necessary since the Panel may decline to transfer the
litigation under section 1407 once the pre-trial proceedings have
advanced and the assigned judge has become familiar with the
issues.
An argument can certainly be made that transfer to certain
courts or retention in others is impractical due to the congested
.nature of the docket. For example, the defendant may argue that
other air disaster litigation has been transferred to the proposed
forum and is still pending, thereby making that locale imprac-
ticable. It should always be remembered that a section 1407
transfer, while theoretically only for pre-trial purposes, may be
-for all purposes, including trial.
In multi-district litigation, section 1407 has numerous advan-
tages including the avoidance of duplication, inconsistent pre-trial
rulings and collateral estoppel problems. This is especially true
'where voluntary coordination is not possible and where there are
many documents to be produced or witnesses to be deposed. When
one plaintiff plans to proceed expeditiously with the minimum of
discovery, of course, collateral estoppel problems multiply.
Section 1407 allows the defendant great flexibility in selecting
the place of trial, since residences of the plaintiff and of the dam-
age witnesses are entitled to minimal consideration. As a result,
section 1407 can be used to force plaintiffs to litigate in incon-
venient locations and to force the trial of damages in more con-
servative communities. Section 1407 usually results in a more
advantageous contribution formula since plaintiff is forced to focus
upon all defendants, and it allows a possible conflict to develop
between the plaintiffs' counsel, such as between counsel represent-
ing the passengers and counsel representing the crew. The settle-
324 See Le Compte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1976); Holmgren
v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 516 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1975); Kennedy v. State Farm,
46 F.R.D. 12 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
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ment and bargaining positions of the plaintiffs are weakened some-
what due to the formalities caused by transfer, litigation in an in-
convenient forum, and the requirement to engage other local
counsel.
There are, of course, disadvantages. State court actions may not
be removeable and, more often than not, may not be amenable to
voluntary coordination. When liability is relatively certain and the
client prefers a speedy resolution transfer may make the litigation
more expensive and settlement more difficult. Inconsistent choice
of law principles may produce inconsistent and troublesome re-
sults, as well as create havoc in court. For example, one court has
required multiple juries to sit and hear evidence at the same time
in order subsequently to apply different substantive and procedural
rules of law.' Although venue and jurisdiction may be improper
in the transferee forum, the litigation may nonetheless remain there
for trial.'
There is, of course, always the spectre of being assigned to one
of the several judges known throughout the country for trouble-
some idiosyncracies and bias against defendants. Other disadvan-
tages include long, drawn-out, structured discovery whereby the
defendant loses a certain amount of flexibility and the right to
control the litigation, and incurs a greater involvement by the judi-
ciary in the discovery process. In addition the defendant must deal
with the binding effect of the Manual for Complex Litigation."1
For those defendants only marginally involved in just a few ac-
tions, transfer under section 1407 would sweep them into complex,
expensive and difficult litigation. If a far away forum is selected
inconvenience to the defendant and its counsel is an obvious dis-
advantage. Similarly, the defendant is inconvenienced by the plain-
tiffs' selection of highly experienced lead counsel who can bring
strength to cases which otherwise would be weak. It is the obliga-
tion of counsel to weigh the advantages against the disadvantages
in attempting to come to a resolution of whether to proceed.
a' Martin v. Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654 (D. Colo. 1980).
The judge in the transferee forum may order immediate trial of a test
case originally brought in that court, thereby perhaps precluding defendant from
further litigating the issues under collateral estoppel principles.
2 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LMGATION (1978).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Is there an available election? Does there exist a real, viable, dis-
criminating alternative to the plaintiff's selection of the forum, a
choice we have assumed for the purposes of this article was
"proper" in the first place? These are the first questions that trial
counsel ought to have asked himself before undertaking the an-
alysis offered in this enterprise. He should have determined the
likelihood of success in his press for a new arena. He should have
searched all of the applicable law and should have become inti-
mately familiar with all relevant factors in the case at bar. He
should have weighed the time, effort and expense of making a
motion to change the forum and should have considered whether
the gain would be worth the cost in time and treasure.'
The motion to change the situs of a lawsuit may well be the
most important appearance counsel makes in court, other than for
trial itself. The hearing can determine the success of all future
proceedings and its significance is enhanced by the fact that there
is only a limited right of appellate review for section 1404(a)
and section 1407 motions."' A section 1407 motion has the added
characteristic that most courts do not remand actions transferred
under the statute upon the completion of pre-trial proceedings.
The strategy and tactics to be employed in the making of the
motion should be directed towards the ultimate aims and goals,
in addition to victory on the motion itself. This may require coun-
sel to treat the motion as a mini-trial and to ask the court that
additional time be set aside for the hearing and for the receipt of
evidence. The use of training aids certainly should be considered,
including flow charts, diagrams and charts showing relevant con-
tact with various states.
On many occasions the courts have stated that section 1404(a)
and section 1407 are not mutually exclusive and that a section
1404(a) motion can be made either before or after a section 1407
motion has been made.' When transfer is desired, section 1407
321 There are those benefits which accrue simply from the making of a motion
even though ultimately it is denied. The court, for example, may be educated
concerning plaintiff's counsel's practice, the weakness of his case or overreaching
in resisting the motion.
39 See Consolidation and Transfer, supra note 228, at 1306-07, 1310.
a'°See, e.g., In Re Frost Patent, 316 F. Supp. 977 (J.P.M.D.L. 1970); In Re
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seems to be an easier route than section 1404(a)." Transfer rarely
is denied under section 1407 in air disaster litigation, the only
genuine question being one of choice of transferee forum. Under
section 1407, the Panel will likely choose the forum with the most
substantial connection to the liability issues and, sometimes, as
in the In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Bombay, India' litigation,
this may result in the choice of a forum with no cases pending at
all. The defendant's burden under section 1404(a) is undoubtedly
greater than under section 1407, and when actions are filed in
many districts, section 1407 clearly provides the most effective
tool.'
When the opportunity presents itself, the optimal choice of a
transferee court will usually be a foreign one, especially if the
accident occurred outside of the United States and the plaintiffs
are neither American residents nor American citizens. In this cir-
cumstance, a strong effort should be made to dismiss under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. This motion ought to be made
prior to any motion to transfer under section 1404(a) and, more
often than not, should not be made in the alternative to a motion
to transfer. The motion to dismiss is not as strong, and the argu-
ment is weakened, when twin motions are made under these two
sections. Twin motions also put the defendant in the conflicting
position of arguing, on the one hand, that a foreign forum is the
most convenient and, on the other hand, that a United States forum
is less inconvenient. As previously noted, however, this tactic has
been successfully used by defendants.'
We embarked upon this enterprise by suggesting that the choice
of place at which to wage the friendly strife in civil litigation is
Koratron, 302 F. Supp. 259 (J.P.M.D.L. 1969); In Re Grain Shipments, 300 F.
Supp. 1402 (J.P.M.D.L. 1969).
11 One commentator has stated, "It is a fair conclusion that, practically speak-
ing, section 1407 has circumvented all the limitations which the federal courts
had placed on section 1404(a)." Consolidation and Transfer, supra note 228, at
1310 n.118.
12 463 F. Supp. 158 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979).
I" One commentator has stated: "It is doubtful that the problem of multiple
litigation was even considered when 1404(a) was enacted, and it is obvious that
the statute is wholly inadequate to meet the situation." Comment, The Problem
of Venue in Multiple District Litigation, 41 NoTRE DAME LAW. 507, 522 (1966).
I" See notes 219-21 supra and accompanying text.
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just as important as selection of a battlefield in war. Counsel should
therefore treat this crucial strategic choice with the same deference
accorded by his military counterpart. By undertaking serious effort
to analyze all of the factors which bear upon this difficult judgment,
defendant may be able to effectuate a change of arena.

